A Different Portrait

Some thoughts on Jesus and Forgiveness: With Special Guests: William Blake, Walter Benjamin, and Vladimir Jankelevitch

2009-12-02T13:45:00.005-05:00

John Moriarty, in Serious Sounds, a story of his childhood growing up in Catholic Ireland, writes: "Was it Blake I wondered who had said that the difference between Jesus and Socrates was that Jesus could say, Your sins are forgiven you." He's close. Blake does write something like this, in pencil, in one of his notebooks (that is now recognized to be an unfinished, or at least unedited, poem). Blake writes:

There is not one Moral Virtue that Jesus Inculcated but Plato & Cicero did Inculcate before him what then did Christ Inculcate. Forgiveness of Sins. This alone is the Gospel & this is the Life & Immortality brought to light by Jesus. Even the Covenant of Jehovah, which is This If you forgive one another your Trespasses so shall Jehovah forgive you That he himself may dwell among you but if you Avenge you Murder the Divine Image & he cannot dwell among you [by his] because you Murder him he arises Again & you deny that he is Arisen & are blind to Spirit.

Blake then gets out his pen and jots down some rhymed couplets. The first stanza reads:

What can this Gospel of Jesus be
What Life & Immortality
What was [It] that he brought to Light
That Plato & Cicero did not write

We find out that, according to Blake, what Jesus "brought to light" was the "forgiveness of sins":

Then Jesus rose & said to [men]
Thy Sins are all forgiven thee

While it may be true that, contrary to Charles Griswold's claim, Plato's (and Aristotle's) use of sungnome doesn't amount to the forgiveness of the Abrahamic heritage, "forgiveness of sins" simpliciter is not unique to Jesus. We should avoid, here, making the same mistake as Hegel in "The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate" when he claimed that Judaism only knew the Law, not love or forgiveness. Such a mistake is similar to those who want to claim that Jesus "died for the truth of the gospels" and then go on to do some fancy intellectual footwork that includes reducing Christianity to some set of religious abstractions (which usually includes forgiveness) and then denying those abstractions (forgiveness) to Judaism. Jesus is doing something else when it comes to forgiveness. He did not discover it, he did not invent it, as if the Jews knew nothing of forgiveness. Rather, the Jews knew quite a bit about forgiveness and what Jesus says about forgiveness in the Gospel accounts would have been met with, at worst, a yawn, and, at best, support. What Jesus says about forgiveness in the Gospel accounts would have been, to borrow a felicitous phrase from E.P. Sanders, " about as controversial as motherhood" to the Jews (E.P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, 333).
Unless, of course, we look at Jesus' claims about forgiving "sinners" - the hamartoloi (behind which we see the Hebrew resha'im), the "wicked." This should hold our attention for awhile: the forgiveness of sinners, the forgiveness of the sins of sinners, the forgiveness of the sins of sinners who remain sinners (because if they were repentant and reformed sinners, they wouldn't be sinners anymore). This would be a forgiveness "without Money & without Price" that we saw in the previous post in which we find a quote from Blake's "Jerusalem." For Blake, this is the Jehovah's forgiveness, this is Jehovah's salvation. Perhaps, as we can see in the Benjamin quote from three posts ago, forgiveness maintains its foremost significance by not being a priori referred exclusively to humans. Perhaps this forgiveness is not a human possibility, perhaps there are things that are, as Arendt writes in a footnote in The Human Condition, "unforgivable, at least on earth" - which refers to a realm in which such things are fulfilled; namely, God's forgiveness. However, that doesn't mean that we can simply be satisfied with our human-all-to-human forgiveness, with the calculations we make and the conditions we set. Pure forgiveness, a forgiveness "without Money & without Price," does set our "duty" for us, does "determine and orient our efforts," as we see in the Jankelevitch quote two posts below. We can get "infinitely nearer to" pure forgiveness, to a forgiveness "without Money & without Price," a forgiveness of the sin and of the sinner who remains a sinner, the sinner qua sinner, a forgiveness of the sinner not "despite" the sin and the fact that they are a sinner, not "even though" they have sinned, but "precisely because" they are a sinner and have sinned.

(When I started writing this, I didn't plan on tying all these quotes together, but once I started they just came together. It needs work, but I think it is a good start.)

Some Lines from Blake

2009-12-02T13:22:00.004-05:00

"Ah my Mary: said Joseph: weeping over & embracing her closely in/
His arms: Doth he [Jehovah] forgive Jerusalem & not exact Purity from her who/
is/
Polluted. I heard his voice in my sleep & his Angel in my dream:/
Saying, Doth Jehovah Forgive a Debt only on condition that it shall/
Be Payed? Doth he Forgive Pollution only on conditions of Purity/
That Debt is not Forgiven! That Pollution is not Forgiven/
Such is the Forgiveness of the Gods, the Moral Virtues of the/
Heathen, whose tender Mercies are Cruelty. But Jehovahs Salvation/
Is without Money & without Price, in Continual Forgiveness of/
Sins/
In the Perpetual Mutual Sacrifice in Great Eternity! for behold!/
There is none that liveth & Sinneth not! And this is the Covenant/
Of Jehovah: If you Forgive one-another, so shall Jehovah Forgive you:/
That He Himself may Dwell among You. Fear not then to take/
To thee Mary thy Wife, for she is with Child by the Holy Ghost"

- William Blake

William Blake, "Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion," Ch 3, Plate 61, lines 14-27 in The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, ed. David V. Erdman (New York: Anchor Books, 1988), 211-212.

Some lines from Jankélévitch

2009-12-01T20:42:00.002-05:00

"Even if no one since the world has been the world has ever forgiven without reservations, without afterthoughts, without mental restrictions, or without an infinitesimal amount of ressentiment, it suffices that the possibility of pure forgiveness is conceivable; even if it has never been attained in fact, the limit of pure forgiveness would still designate our duty to us, would determine and orient our efforts, would furnish a criterion for permitting us to distinguish between the pure and the impure, and would give a standard of measure to evaluation and a direction to charity. The one who never attains the ideal (the ideal being made precisely for never being attained) can get infinitely nearer to it. It is what the Phaedo, speaking of intelligible essences, calls eggutata ienai, 'to go closest'."

- Vladimir Jankélévitch

Vladimir Jankélévitch, Forgiveness, trans. Andrew Kelley (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005) 115-116.

Some Lines from Benjamin

2009-11-25T21:46:00.012-05:00

"It should be pointed out that certain correlative concepts retain their meaning, and possibly their foremost significance, if they are [not a priori] referred exclusively to man. One might, for example, speak of an unforgettable life or moment even if all men had forgotten it. If the nature of such a life or moment required that it be unforgotten, that predicate would not imply a falsehood but merely a claim not fulfilled by men, and probably also a reference to a realm in which it is fulfilled: God’s remembrance."
- Walter Benjamin

Walter Benjamin, “Task of the Translator,” Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Shocken Books, 1969), 70. Hannah Arendt quoted this passage in her essay on Walter Benjamin and the differences are included in brackets. See Hannah Arendt, “Walter Benjamin,” Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, INC, 1968), 203.

Undoing What Has Been Done: Arendt and Levinas on Forgiveness

2009-05-29T22:11:00.003-04:00

[Here is a copy of the paper I presented at the conference "Forgiveness: Probing the Boundaries" in Salzburg, Austria on March 15, 2009. The paper will be published in the conference proceedings later this year. Allow me three disclaimers. 1) This paper is a shorter version of the paper that I wrote for the course "Ethics After Auschwitz: Adorno and Levinas" at the Institute for Christian Studies (Toronto) in Spring 2009. The version of the paper for that course was 25 pages long and I had to cut it down to 8 pages for the conference - no easy task! - and, therefore, I have cut out a majority of the literary flourishes with the hope that this doesn't make it dry and boring. 2) I am writing my PhD dissertation on the topic of forgiveness, focusing primarily on the work of Hannah Arendt. Presently as I envision my dissertation, a version of this paper is to make up the final chapter and, therefore, this paper assumes quite a bit - and perhaps too much. For example, Derrida's discussion of forgiveness isn't discussed in this paper, but it plays a large part in my understanding of forgiveness. Also, cutting this paper down to 8 pages forced me to assume a lot more than I had originally assumed in the 25 page version. 3) I have made a few changes to the argument since I delivered this paper (which I won't go into here). As time goes on, I am less and less satisfied with the argument (even to the point of questioning whether or not I actually make an argument). However, this is the version of the paper I delivered at the conference.
Anyway, I know it is rather long, but any comments, questions, criticisms, or whatever would be greatly appreciated. Thanks!]

If it is true that to forgive a person qua offender involves forgiving the person’s deed qua offense, what does it mean to forgive an offense?[1] Focusing my argument around Hannah Arendt and Emmanuel Levinas, I will argue that forgiveness involves undoing a misdeed by reversing time, acting upon the past misdeed, and making it as if it did not happen. Such an act of forgiveness, thus, releases the sinner from the sinful past by giving the sinner a new past, a new beginning, and the possibility of beginning anew. To begin, we will turn to Arendt’s understanding of forgiveness as reversing the irreversible.

In The Human Condition, Arendt discusses action as involving the possibility of new beginnings.[2] Action as beginning “corresponds to the fact of birth” as the “actualization of the human condition of natality.”[3] Natality, for Arendt, is concerned with “the new beginning inherent in birth,” and is “the capacity for beginning something anew” on one’s own initiative, which each “newcomer possesses.”[4] For Arendt, this capacity for action means that “the unexpected can be expected,” that humans are “able to perform what is infinitely improbable. And this… is possible only because each [person] is unique, so that with each birth something uniquely new comes into the world.”[5] Action as a “new beginning” then is a “miracle,” for Arendt, in that any new beginning “always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability.”[6] Every act “breaks into the world as an infinite improbability.”[7] Natality, the capacity to begin ever anew inherent in each individual by virtue of being born, is the source of our faith and hope that we are not condemned to some fatalistic eternal recurrence of the same, that what has happened did not have to happen and does not have to happen again. Thanks to natality, we can expect the unexpectable occurrence of the miraculous.

Such free action is boundless, unpredictable, and irreversible – three (potentially hazardous) characteristics of action. First, action is boundless. Action establishes relationships, opens limitations, and cuts across all boundaries. Laws, which are meant to protect against the boundlessness of action, are never reliable safeguards against such boundlessness. Second, action is unpredictable, in that it is impossible to foretell “the consequences of an act within a community of equals where everybody has the same capacity to act.”[8] The only possible safeguard against the unpredictability of action, for Arendt, is the making and keeping of promises. Promises are the uniquely human way of ordering the future, making it predictable and reliable to the extent that this is humanly possible.[9] Third, action is irreversible. Once one acts, the action cannot be taken back and has uncontrollable consequences. It is irreversible in that one is “unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing.”[10] Promises do not provide an absolute safeguard against the unpredictability of action and, therefore, we need some way in which to reverse the irreversible action in order to release or unbind the offender from the offence and its consequences. This is where Arendt brings in the faculty of forgiveness as the “possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility.”[11]

Forgiveness, for Arendt, is itself an action – a miraculous new beginning – which creates a new situation. Forgiveness – as opposed to vengeance or revenge, which are predictable reactions with no power to unbind – “can never be predicted; it is the only reaction that acts in an unexpected way and thus retains, though being a reaction, something of the original character of action.”[12] Furthermore, forgiveness is a “reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.”[13] Here we see that, for Arendt, forgiveness, as a new action, frees both the forgiver and the forgiven from the consequences of the original action. Forgiveness is an action which redeems the irreversibility of action in that “forgiving attempts the seemingly impossible, to undo what has been done, and… it succeeds in making a new beginning where beginnings seemed to have become no longer possible.”[14] In part, forgiveness is the undoing or reversing of “what was done” – the act – “for the sake of who did it.”[15] Forgiveness, by attempting the impossible task of reversing the irreversible or undoing what has been done, is a new beginning where beginnings appear to be impossible, an action, which comes from the other and releases our capacity to act from the consequences of boundless, unpredictable, and irreversible action in order for it to be possible to begin anew.[16]

There are two characteristics of forgiveness as Arendt understands it in The Human Condition. On the one hand, Arendt understands forgiveness as a release, an unbinding of an agent from the consequences of an action.[17] On the other hand, Arendt holds that forgiveness is the undoing of what has been done for the sake of the one who did it.[18] These two characteristics are combined in The Human Condition, thus forging an understanding of forgiveness that focuses on the impossible and miraculous task of undoing the act in order to release the agent from its consequences.

In her work on forgiveness after The Human Condition, however, Arendt goes on to separate these two characteristics, no longer speaking of forgiveness as undoing while still maintaining the understanding of forgiveness as release that focuses exclusively on the person.[19]

But is Arendt too quick in jettisoning her understanding of forgiveness as reversing the irreversible, as undoing what has been done? Can an agent be released from her act without in some way having the act be forgiven?[20] I will argue that Arendt has jettisoned this understanding of forgiveness too quickly; the unbinding of the agent from the past deed does involve, in some way, undoing the past deed.

While one is not simply the sum of one’s actions – that is, one is not exhausted by one’s various inscriptions in the world, as Paul Ricoeur would say[21] – action, according to Arendt, does reveal, make manifest, or disclose “who somebody is.”[22] In light of this “revelatory character” of action[23] – that is, since any particular act reveals “who” the agent is – the agent is indissolubly bound to and, in an important sense, “one” with the act. If it is the case, as Arendt argues, that deeds reveal “who” a person is, then to forgive a person without forgiving the person’s deed would be to forgive that person only up to a point. It would be to forgive the part of the offender who either has not offended in the past or will not offend in the future, but it is not to forgive the “who” revealed in this deed, the offender qua offender, the part of the offender that has been offending and thus needs forgiveness. Forgiveness, rather, focuses on the “who” revealed in this deed, on the instant of offending when the offender is, in an important sense, “one” with the offense – so indissolubly bound to the offense that to forgive the offender also means to forgive the offense. Therefore, I think that Arendt has jettisoned too quickly her understanding of forgiveness as undoing what was done, and that we should pick it back up and take it farther.

In her discussion of forgiveness as reversing in The Human Condition, Arendt is not clear about what such a reversal of the irreversible entails. What does it mean to “undo” what has been done? Does she take such an undoing in a metaphysical sense in which the forgiver takes the place of Peter Damian’s omnipotent God and, reaching back in time, “physically” or “literally” makes something that was done in the past not to have been done at all?[24] Such an undoing, it seems to me, would not only annul the past but would also annul the forgiveness inasmuch as there would be nothing to forgive, the offender would become innocent having never offended to begin with. Forgiveness does not make the offender innocent; it makes the offender forgiven. Forgiveness requires that the past offense be left standing – or else there would be nothing to forgive – even as it requires that it somehow be undone or reversed. We need a forgiveness that is an undoing of a deed – which it has to be if it is going to be forgiveness of the offending aspect of the offender – and, at the same time, one that does not just eradicate the deed. Therefore, rather than understanding the undoing or reversing in such a metaphysical sense, I will read this undoing or reversing in what John Caputo calls a “purely ethico-phenomenological sense.”[25] In such a reading, I will turn to Levinas who is more explicit about what such an undoing or reversing would entail; namely, forgiveness is a reversing of time and an acting upon the past that makes it as if the event never happened, as if the deed had not been done, as if the doer had not done the deed.

For Levinas, one can “give the past a new meaning,” “repair the past” by re-narrating it, putting it in a new perspective, thus freeing and opening up the future.[26] This is the hermeneutical work of memory, the “salutary character of succession,” in which the past is re-presented and repaired within limits, but time keeps marching on.[27] By re-presenting and remembering – which is what Arendt means by teshuvah or repentance – one can retell one’s past, find new meanings for one’s past, and repair one’s past, but only so much.[28] As Robert Gibbs tells us, “it is FORGIVENESS that changes the past, not repentance” or memory.[29] In and of itself without recourse to others, memory has its limits; it can only do so much, “its age limits its powers,” as Levinas would say.[30] Without recourse to others – that is, without being forgiven – the past can be repaired, retold, and redescribed, but not to the point of changing it.

In contrast to the limited power of re-presenting the past, which is predicated on a successive understanding of time as becoming in which one is always launched toward the future and “toward death,” Levinas discusses what he calls “the discontinuous time of fecundity” which “makes possible an absolute youth and recommencement.”[31] This discontinuous time, beyond mere re-presentation, is the time of forgiveness in which, similarly to Arendt’s understanding, it bequeaths a radical new beginning without which “the I would remain a subject in which every adventure would revert into the adventure of a fate,” and thus no adventure at all.[32] When discussing “discontinuous time,” Levinas has in mind the parent/child relationship in which the parent has new chances in the life of the child; the child represents a new beginning for the parent. “My child is a stranger,” Levinas writes, invoking Isaiah 49, “but a stranger who is not only mine, for he is me. He is me a stranger to myself.”[33] It seems that Levinas is not discussing the parent/child relationship in a strictly intergenerational sense, and I would like to say that this discontinuity of time can be regenerational, pertain to the possibility of rebirth within the lifetime of a single person.[34] In a word, forgiveness is not only concerned with one’s flesh and blood child, but with one’s own rebirth. When someone forgives an offender, the offender is given a new birth in the eyes of the forgiver. Forgiveness, then, is “the very work of time”[35] since, as Levinas writes in Time and the Other, “time is essentially a new birth.”[36]

Forgiveness, for Levinas, is paradoxical in that it is retroactive and, as the “very work of time,” opens up the past itself and changes and acts upon it. From the view of “common time,” in which the present acts for the future but not the past, forgiveness “represents an inversion of the natural order of things” in that it is a “retroaction,” a reversing of time.[37] In remembering, we only bring the past forward, re-present the past, but do not go back and change the past. For Levinas, forgiveness “refers to the instant elapsed” in that “it permits the subject who has committed himself in a past instant to be as though that instant had not passed on, to be as though he had not committed himself.”[38] In forgiveness, what was done in the past is “undone” not in some metaphysical sense in which one “physically” or “literally” changes the past but, for Levinas, the past is ‘undone’ in a “purely ethico-phenomenological sense.”[39] Here the past is not manipulated, distorted, annulled, or abandoned and blotted out by forgetting. Rather, forgiveness, which is more active than forgetting, “acts upon the past, somehow repeats the event, purifying it.”[40] The past is not re-presented in the present through memory, or nullified through forgetting, but repeated in the past. Furthermore, the past event is repeated, but repeated differently, as if it has not passed, as if it never happened, as if the doer had not “committed” herself in action. Forgiveness is a “rigorously ethical event” in which the other reverses time and repeats the past as if it had not happened and as if the agent had not committed herself, therefore, altering “the event of the past, while preserving the past offense.”[41] Historically, the deed was done, but ethically, it is as if it had not been done.[42]

Such repetition purifies or cleanses the past event – the past is washed clean, not washed away – and “conserves the past pardoned in the purified present.”[43] Forgiveness cleanses the past event and repairs it “by repeating the past as forgiven.”[44] So while the event did happen, it is repeated in the past as if it did not happen and its reality is transformed in the present. By being forgiven, as Jeffrey Dudiak writes, “[i]t is not that my past is eliminated… but time will be relived, over and again, providing the possibility of a break with the past that is not heavy with this past, of a recommencement in time, liberated, time and again, with each passing generation, from fate.”[45] In forgiveness, I am given a new beginning, I become a child. Both pasts – the sinful one in which the event did happen and the cleansed or purified one in which it is as if the event did not happen – are conserved in the present. Therefore, forgiveness does not reinstate innocence, because the past did happen,[46] yet, forgiveness acts upon the past making it as if it did not happen.

Levinas then goes on to discuss forgiveness as constituting time itself. Time, for Levinas, is not the achievement of my consciousness, it is not of my doing, the future is not a ‘future-present’, a set of “indistinguishable possibles which flow toward my present and which I would grasp.”[47] Rather, time comes from across an “absolute interval” from the other as tout autre as a gift.[48] As Caputo writes: “The gift of forgiveness from the other belongs to the way the other, in forgiving me, gives me time.”[49] In forgiveness, this gift of time from the other is a gift of a new past, a cleansed sinful past, a forgiven past. In giving me my past, the other “unknots” me from my sinful past and “knots” me to the gift of a forgiven past.[50] Forgiveness, for Levinas, is the gift of time, the gift of a new birth.

To conclude, we should focus on this mention of “new birth” which reveals the most striking similarity between Levinas and Arendt. For Arendt, natality is the capacity to begin anew that humans have by virtue of being born. For both Arendt and Levinas, in forgiving, we see the new birth or “recommencement” coming from the other. The other, for Levinas, gives me a new past, which releases me from my “sinful” past, and, therefore, gives the possibility of a new future, a “new chance for desiring and being good.”[51] By forgiving, the other gives me time, gives me a new past, and gives me a new beginning. In the eyes of the forgiving other, it is as if one did not do what one did; the forgiven person is released from what she did and therefore is given a new beginning. Such a gift of a new beginning allows for the possibility of beginning anew, the possibility to “capitalize” upon our capacity of natality. Forgiveness both is a new beginning and gives a new beginning where one no longer seemed to be possible. For both Arendt and Levinas, forgiveness is that way in which humans give birth to the child of the future.

Arendt is on the right path when she discusses forgiveness as the reversing of the irreversible, or the undoing of what has been done for the sake of the one who did it. In order to forgive a person, the deed must be altered in some way; it must be undone or reversed. Arendt is correct, that is, to focus forgiveness in part on the deed itself and not simply on the doer, and I think we should not be quick to jettison such an understanding of forgiveness. From here we can pick up Arendt’s understanding of forgiveness as undoing or reversing again, and take it in a Levinasian direction in order to explicate what such an undoing or reversing would entail. Forgiveness, in part, focuses on a past misdeed, reversing time in order to (retro)act upon the misdeed, repeating it and purifying it, undoing or reversing the misdeed, making it as if the misdeed had not been done, as if the agent had not committed the misdeed, thus, giving the agent a new, forgiven past and the possibility of beginning anew. The deed has been done; yet, by forgiving, the past is cleansed and the future is opened for the offender to begin again as if the deed were never done.[52]

ENDNOTES

[1] Already, Arendt would contest such a question because forgiveness , for her, is not concerned with “offenses” (cf footnote 16). This paper assumes that to forgive the doer is at the same time to forgive a deed qua misdeed. I briefly (but by no means exhaustively) explain why I think this is the case later in the paper.

[2] Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958). (Hereafter HC.) This beginning is only one part of action (archein). There is also another side to action, namely acting in concert to see the action through (prattein). “Here it seems as though each action were divided into two parts, the beginning made by a single person and the achievement in which many join by ‘bearing’ and ‘finishing’ the enterprise, by seeing it through.” (Arendt, HC, 189). (This has been, from the beginning of political philosophy, divided between two different stations in society; the ruler (archein) and the ruled (prattein). However, Arendt sees this as an attempt to control the unpredictability and irreversibility of action.)

[3] Arendt, HC, 178.

[4] Arendt, HC, 9, 176-177. See also HC, 246 where Arendt implicitly distances herself from Heidegger when she writes that “men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in order to begin.”

[5] Arendt, HC, 178.

[6] Arendt, HC, 178.

[7] Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom?,” Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 1968), 167.

[8] Arendt, HC, 244.

[9] Although I will not attempt it in this paper, it would be interesting to discuss action in relation to Jacques Derrida’s “archi-promise.” For Derrida, language promises, namely, by speaking, I am promising to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth (but language is just a pointer and never delivers the “thing itself”), even if you lie (and this is why a lie works, because by speaking you are promising to tell the truth). Perhaps we could say, in a similar way, that action promises, namely, by acting, I am promising (perhaps the universal, or justice, or whatever), a promise that I cannot fulfill (so we always need forgiveness). See Jacques Derrida, Memoires: For Paul de Man, trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 119 and Howard Coward and Toby Foshay, eds., Derrida and Negative Theology (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), 84-85.

[10] Arendt, HC, 237.

[11] Arendt, HC, 237. Arendt sees the consumptive cycle of labor redeemed by work and the category of means and ends of work redeemed by action and speech. However, the redemption of the irreversibility and unpredictability of action “does not arise out of another and possibly higher faculty” (as with labor and work); rather, the redemption is “one of the potentialities of action itself” – namely, forgiveness and the making and keeping of promises. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to make the argument, I don’t agree with Arendt that forgiveness is a “potentiality” of action itself. If the possibility for reversal is built in, then the irreversible is not really irreversible and the reversal is not really a miracle.

[12] Arendt, HC, 241. Forgiveness, for Arendt, is the opposite of vengeance or revenge. Vengeance is a re-action against the original action. However, it does not put an end to the consequences of the action. Rather, “everybody remains bound to the process, permitting the chain reaction contained in every action to take its unhindered course.” Vengeance is programmable, expected, predictable, and calculable; forgiveness is not. See Arendt, HC, 240-241.

[13] Arendt, HC, 241. Arendt holds that forgiveness is the “only” reaction that “acts anew and unexpectedly.” But is it the only one? What about turning the other cheek? What about being grateful to the offender for providing an opportunity for my own personal growth?

[14]Hannah Arendt, “The Tradition of Political Thought,” The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 58.

[15] Arendt, HC, 241.

[16] I would like to point to perhaps the main problem I have with Arendt’s notion of forgiveness as undoing and releasing. Forgiveness, for Arendt, is concerned with undoing what was done in order to release the person from the consequences of action and not from the action itself because action, in the very specific, normative, phenomenological way in which Arendt describes it, is an “end in itself” (Arendt, HC, 206.) and is therefore “good” in and of itself and does not need to be forgiven. However, actions, as boundless and unpredictable, can become “trespasses” (harmartanein. Arendt, HC, 240 and n. 78.). “Trespassing,” according to Arendt:

is an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly. Only through this constant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents (Arendt, HC, 240).

Since action is unpredictable, when we act “we know not what we do” and every day we “miss the mark.” Forgiveness, then, is not concerned with those unpunishable and unforgiveable “offenses” (skandala. See Arendt, HC, 240, n. 80 and Hannah Arendt, “Some Questions on Moral Philosophy,” Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 125). Forgiveness and punishment are alternatives, for Arendt, in that they both “attempt to put an end to something that without interference could go on endlessly” (Arendt, HC, 241). A deed that turns out to be unpunishable, according to Arendt, is also unforgiveable, and vice versa. Such a deed is an offense which “since Kant, we call ‘radical evil’”( Arendt, HC, 241). Therefore, on the one hand, radically evil offenses, for Arendt, are outside of the realm of forgiveness and punishment. In the destructive case of “radical evil,” Arendt repeats with Jesus: “It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea” (Arendt, HC, 241. Here, Arendt is quoting Luke 17:2). However, on the other hand, “crime and willed evil” are outside the realm of forgiveness as well (However, in her later writings, Arendt holds that “it is the person and not the crime that is forgiven” (Arendt, “Some Questions on Moral Philosophy,” 95. My emphasis. It is interesting that she uses the word “crime” here and not “trespass.” Is this because she has broadened the boundaries of forgiveness to include the possibility of forgiving someone who has committed a crime?). Crime or willed evil are, according to Arendt’s reading of Jesus, dealt with at the Last Judgment which “is not characterized by forgiveness but by just retribution” (Arendt, HC, 240). In a word, forgiveness, for Arendt, is not concerned with evil (See Amos Friedland’s “Evil and Forgiveness: Transitions,” Perspectives on Evil and Human Wickedness, Vol. 1, No. 4, 2004, 24-47).

Why can’t evil deeds be forgiven? Arendt seems to make forgiveness a rather trivial matter that is too predictable, expected, and calculated (three things she said forgiveness is not. Arendt, HC, 241). What is more unpredictable, unexpected, and uncalculated than forgiving something that appears to be unforgiveable? It may be better if they were never born, but why not afford them the possibility of being reborn? Why not forgive? (For a discussion of forgiveness as forgiving the unforgiveable, see Jacques Derrida “To Forgive: The Unforgiveable and the Imprescriptible,” in Questioning God, ed. John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley, and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 21-51, Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. by Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 27-60). While Arendt focuses forgiveness on undoing what was done in order to release a person from the consequences of an unpredictable and boundless action, I would like to follow Levinas, to whom we now turn, and focus it on undoing what was done in order to release a person from the action itself, from the deed qua misdeed, from the offense and not simply from the consequences of an action that has “missed the mark.” Forgiveness, as I understand it, involves the undoing of an offense, the reversing of a misdeed in order to release the agent from the misdeed, from the offense as well as its consequences.

[17] In this regard here are two quotes: “Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done…” (Arendt, HC, 237) and “Only through this constant mutual release from what they do…” (Arendt, HC, 240).

[18] Arendt writes that “forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of the past” (Arendt, HC, 237). Later, she writes about forgiveness as “the undoing of what was done” and goes on to write that “what was done is forgiven for the sake of who did it” (Arendt, HC, 241). Here I assume that by “forgiven” she means the “undoing” of what was done.

[19] After reading The Human Condition, W.H. Auden, in a letter to Arendt, questioned her claim that we forgive “what was done… for the sake of who did it” (Arendt, HC, 241). “I was wrong,” Arendt concedes, “when I said we forgive what was done for the sake of who did it…. I can forgive somebody without forgiving anything” (Arendt to Auden, 14 February 1960, Library of Congress. (Arendt’s files do not contain the letter from Auden to which she was replying). See Elisabeth Young-Breuhl, For Love of the World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), 371). Therefore, as she writes in her essay “Some Questions on Moral Philosophy,” Arendt came to understand that “it is the person and not the crime that is forgiven” (Hannah Arendt, “Some Questions on Moral Philosophy,” 95). Here we see that Arendt no longer understands forgiveness to be directed at the act in order to release the agent from the consequences of an action; rather, forgiveness is focused solely on the person. Therefore, forgiveness, for Arendt, is no longer concerned with undoing what was done; rather, it is concerned with releasing the agent from the act. Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, a student of Arendt’s, writes that forgiveness as “releasing is much better for [Arendt’s] purposes than undoing or reversing for it carries no implication that the deed is forgotten or dissolved in some way, while releasing implies being unbound from the past in order to go on: it is a letting go” (Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Why Arendt Matters (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 100). But is Arendt too quick in jettisoning her understanding of forgiveness as reversing the irreversible, as undoing what has been done?

[20] Does forgiveness as undoing necessarily imply that the “deed is forgotten or dissolved in some way,” as Young-Bruehl says? Can you “forgive somebody without forgiving anything,” as Arendt says? Can an agent be released from her act without in some way forgiving the act? Can one simply forgive an agent and not forgive the act?

[21] Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 490.

[22] Arendt, HC, 178. For Arendt’s discussion of action as disclosing “who” the actor is, see Arendt, HC, 175ff .

[23] Arendt, HC, 178.

[24] See Peter Damian’s “On Divine Omnipotence,” in Peter Damian, Letters, vol. 4, trans. Owen J. Blum (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998).

[25] John D. Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 229.

[26] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 282.

[27] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 282.

[28] Arendt, “Some Questions on Moral Philosophy,” 111-112. See also Robert Gibbs, Why Ethics? Signs of Responsibilities (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 349.

[29] Gibbs, Why Ethics?, 351.

[30] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 282.

[31] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 282.

[32] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 282.

[33] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 267. Levinas’ emphasis.

[34] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 229.

[35] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 282.

[36] Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1987), 81.

[37] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 283.

[38] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 283.

[39] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 229.

[40] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 283.

[41] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 229-230. Caputo also says that forgiveness alters the “meaning of the past,” but how is this not just re-presenting?

[42] As Kierkegaard would say, alluding to Isaiah 38:17, in forgiving, the past misdeed is placed “behind one’s back” and when one “turns to the one he forgives,” “he cannot see what lies behind his back” even though he is still aware of it. (Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), 274-275). While the deed has still historically been done, when the forgiver faces the forgiven person the deed is not seen by the forgiver, but the forgiver still is not unaware of the deed. In this sense, the deed was done and the forgiver knows it was done, but when facing the person with the deed behind the forgiver’s back, it is as if it was not done.

[43] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 283.

[44] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 230.

[45] Jeffrey Dudiak, The Intrigue of Ethics: A Reading of the Idea of Discourse in the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 276. Here, Dudiak makes reference to two passages in Totality and Infinity: “Reality is what it is, but will be once again, another time freely resumed and pardoned” (Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 284) and “The fact and the justification of time consist in the recommencement it makes possible in the resurrection, across fecundity, of all the compossibles sacrificed in the present” (Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 284).

[46] Levinas writes that “[t]he pardoned being is not the innocent being.” Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 283.

[47] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 283.

[48] Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 283.

[49] Caputo, The Weakness of God, 231.

[50] Gibbs, Why Ethics?, 352. Also see Caputo, The Weakness of God, 231.

[51] Adriaan Peperzak, To The Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1993), 200.

[52] I would like to thank Ronald A. Kuipers, Jeffrey Dudiak, and Shannon Hoff for their extensive and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Lambert Zuidervaart who, along with Shannon, Ron, and Jeff, lead a seminar entitled “Ethics After Auschwitz: Adorno and Levinas” at the Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto in Spring 2008. This paper is a shorter version of the paper that I wrote for that seminar.

Derrida: The Aporia of Forgiveness? by Richard J. Bernstein

2008-11-30T20:59:00.003-05:00

Richard J. Bernstein, “Derrida: The Aporia of Forgiveness?” Constellations, Volume 13, Number 3, 2006, 394-406.

In the article “Derrida: The Aporia of Forgiveness?,” Richard Bernstein argues that Derrida does not do full justice to decision and responsibility because he neglects the role of judgment and deliberation. Bernstein looks to reflective judgment (Kant and Arendt) and phronesis (Aristotle) as two inherited concepts relevant to thinking about decision and responsibility which Derrida neglects, and that these two concepts would be helpful to “illuminate what Derrida tends to mystify with his appeal to aporias and impossible possibles” (404).

After identifying two issues that have spurred Derrida’s work on forgiveness – 1) the various “Truth and Reconciliation” commissions and 2) public requests for forgiveness by public officials – Bernstein picks up on a third issue – namely, the relationship between the forgivable and the unforgivable. Derrida agrees with that some things are unforgivable. However, unlike Jankélévitch and Arendt who say that we cannot and should not forgive such deeds, Derrida “affirms that the only thing that calls for forgiveness, the only thing to forgive is the unforgivable!” (395). Bernstein goes on to discuss our inheritance of “two incompatible heterogeneous ‘concepts’ of forgiveness” that are nevertheless “indissociable” – namely, conditional forgiveness and unconditional forgiveness (396). Conditional forgiveness is steeped in an economy of exchange that involves repentance, forgiveness asked for, forgiveness received, and leads toward reconciliation or healing. However, “Derrida insists that conditional forgiveness – taken by itself – is not forgiveness” (396). This is the case because simple conditional forgiveness fails to recognize that conditional forgiveness is indissociable from unconditional forgiveness. Unconditional forgiveness is pure, aneconomic forgiveness that seeks no finality. However, for unconditional forgiveness to “arrive” it must “engage itself in a series of conditions of all kinds” (Derrida, On Forgiveness, 44-45) and, therefore, while heterogeneous to conditional forgiveness, it is indissociable from it.

It is in the tension between these two irreconcilable and indissociable poles of forgiveness – unconditional forgiveness and conditional forgiveness – that “decisions and responsibilities are to be taken” (Derrida, On Forgiveness, 45). For Derrida, according to Bernstein, “there are no rules, no decision procedures, nothing that we can rely on in making decisions – including decisions about when, whom, and what to forgive” (398). This is what Bernstein calls “Derrida’s hidden (or perhaps it is not so hidden) existentialism” (398). We are faced with these two heterogeneous (yet indissociable) inherited understandings of forgiveness that both make a claim on us, and there are no ready-made answers for how to live in this aporetic tension. However, in this aporetic tension we have to make a decision and because there are no rules or ready-made answers the decisions we make while trembling in the abyss are our responsibility. We cannot pass the buck and blame some rule. This decision is our responsibility and can never be rationally justified. This aporia is where decisions and responsibilities are taken. As Derrida says: “For the responsible decision to be envisaged and taken, we have to go through pain and aporia, a situation in which I do not know what to do” (“On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques Derrida,” 62). Bernstein goes on to conclude his “sympathetic account” of Derrida’s understanding of forgiveness by following Agnes Heller’s remark that “[o]ne does not ask Derrida what he wants to say, but what he wants to avoid.” According to Bernstein, Derrida wants to avoid “the corruption and trivialization of forgiveness” by the hollow and often hypocritical public requests for forgiveness such as the first two issues that spurred Derrida’s recent work on forgiveness discussed at the beginning of the article. He wants to avoid the understanding of forgiveness in terms of economy and finality and its confusion with reconciliation. Furthermore, he wants to avoid “the illusion that we can ‘justify’ forgiveness” by appealing to some rule or standard. Finally, and most importantly, Derrida wants to avoid “any possibility of our thinking that the responsible decision to forgive is normal or easy” (399).

From here, Bernstein concludes his “sympathetic account” and moves to a more critical engagement with Derrida’s understanding of forgiveness. Since Bernstein finds “the same ‘logic’ at work, the same tracking down of aporias, and the same insistence on the way in which the unconditional and the conditional are heterogeneous and indissociable in his other conceptual genealogies,” he thinks that the “difficulties that [he] locate[s] in his reflections on forgiveness reverberate throughout [Derrida’s] thinking.” (399).

While Derrida says that forgiveness has nothing to do with judgment or knowledge (399. cf Derrida’s On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 43 and “On Forgiveness” Roundtable, 70), Bernstein claims that “forgiveness has everything to do with judgment, and that frequently, knowledge is crucial for making a responsible decision to forgive or not to forgive” (399). However, after a clear exposition of Derrida’s understanding, here, Bernstein’s discussion becomes somewhat muddled. He begins by claiming that “Derrida’s analysis of forgiveness depends on making a ‘rigorous’ distinction between the forgivable and the unforgivable” (400). For Derrida, forgiveness forgives the unforgivable and he is in agreement with Jankélévitch and Arendt that certain things are unforgivable. However, Bernstein goes on to list certain events – such as Heidegger’s actions as rector of Freiburg University and Paul De Man’s failure to inform his friends that he wrote anti-Semitic articles as a young man – that, when it comes to whether they are forgivable or unforgivable, are more open to debate. Bernstein claims that deciding whether or not something is unforgivable is “always a contestable issue that is fraught with difficulties” and that these decisions are characterized by “arguments” and “judgments” which frequently involve “knowledge” (400). As Bernstein writes, “even if [we] were to accept Derrida’s aporia, ‘forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable’, we first have to make a judgment about what is truly unforgivable” (400). He then goes to make the same case about the “forgivable.” He concludes that the boundary between the forgivable and the unforgivable is open to dispute, that the decision between what is forgivable and unforgivable always involves judgments, and, in the spirit of Wittgenstein, “that there is no rigorous distinction between what is unforgivable and forgivable except the line that we draw” (401). However, I don’t think that Derrida would deny this and it seems that this is precisely what Derrida is talking about. We attempt to set up hard boundaries and say that anything on this side is forgivable and anything on that side is unforgivable. Derrida is trying to unsettle this arbitrary boundary and call us beyond it. It seems impossible to forgive something beyond this boundary, beyond this boundary is the unforgiveable, to this Derrida says “why not forgive it?,” forgiveness forgives the unforgivable. Unconditional forgiveness is unsettling the line we draw between the forgivable and the unforgivable and calling it into question. It appears that Bernstein is confusing the distinction between the forgivable and the unforgivable with the distinction between conditional forgiveness and unconditional forgiveness. This appears to be the case because directly after his discussion of the “rigorous distinction” between the forgivable and the unforgivable, Bernstein writes: “Suppose – for the sake of argument – we assume that there is a sharp, rigorous distinction between unconditional and conditional forgiveness” (401). But he never critiqued the sharp, rigorous distinction between unconditional and conditional forgiveness, so why is he granting Derrida the point and assuming this for the sake of argument? If Bernstein thinks the forgivable/unforgivable distinction is the same as the conditional/unconditional distinction, he has yet to make that point. The difference, as I see it, is that the forgivable/unforgivable distinction is the one that we draw, as Bernstein argues, but the conditional/unconditional distinction is the heterogeneous inheritance that calls the line we draw between, and the judgments we make about, the forgivable and the unforgivable into question.

Bernstein then moves to the question: How is one to decide when to forgive the unforgivable? For Derrida, according to Bernstein, this question is unanswerable as “there is no rule or algorithm for making such decisions” (401). Bernstein agrees “with this claim” but then asks us to “consider what we actually do when we ask ourselves should we forgive what is… unforgiveable” (401-402). We ask ourselves questions, deliberate, debate, argue, weigh the pros and cons, struggle with ourselves, negotiate, and make judgments (402-403). Derrida often uses this word “negotiate,” and Bernstein describes it (while he doesn’t see Derrida using it in this way) as meaning “that we are required to make careful discriminating judgments – to evaluate pros and cons – to consider what is relevant to this particular situation. This is a deliberative process” (403). Bernstein then asks what it means to face incompatible injunctions and suggests that “this is the experience of deliberation and judgment, the struggle to probe and assess the situation so that I can make a responsible decision” (403). Bernstein is still trying to critique Derrida’s statement that “forgiveness has precisely nothing to do with judgment” (On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 43), so I think we should take a closer look at that. In this section (section III) of Derrida’s “On Forgiveness,” he is discussing the possibility of a politics of forgiveness. He writes that “[o]ne could never, in the ordinary sense of the words, found a politics or law on forgiveness” because “forgiveness remains heterogeneous to the order of politics or of the juridical as they are ordinarily understood” (39). He then goes on to discuss the “Truth and Reconciliation” commission in South Africa and Desmond Tutu’s recounting of a woman’s testimony before the commission (43). Tutu translates and interprets what she says as: “A commission or a government cannot forgive. Only I, eventually, could do it. (And I am not ready to forgive)” (43). The passage Bernstein quotes appears in the very next paragraph. Derrida writes:

These are very difficult words to hear. This woman victim, this wife of the victim… surely wanted to recall that the anonymous body of the State or of a public institution cannot forgive. It has neither the right nor the power to do so; and besides, that would have no meaning. The representative of the State can judge, but forgiveness has precisely nothing to do with judgment. Or even with the public or political sphere. (43, my emphasis).

Bernstein inserts a footnote when he first quotes Derrida as saying “forgiveness has precisely nothing to do with judgment.” The footnote reads: “Derrida does not qualify these remarks about forgiveness, judgments, and knowledge. But his remark about judgment refers primarily to judgment in the political or public sphere” (405, n. 10). It is rather odd that Bernstein has pushed this statement into a footnote. Bernstein recognizes the context of the quote, but pulls it out of its context in order to use it as a proof-text in the body of the paper while relegating this statement about the context of the quote to a footnote. This seems to be a rather back-handed way to make his argument run more smoothly. Nevertheless, Bernstein would have to show, and he doesn’t, why this remark about judgment refers “primarily,” and not “solely,” to political or public judgment. In context, Derrida is discussing how the State cannot forgive. The representative of the State can judge, there are courts of justice, but they have neither the power nor the right to forgive. They can judge, but forgiveness has precisely nothing to do with judgment, with the judgment of judges, with judicial justice. Bernstein says Derrida does not qualify his statement, but it seems that the context in which Derrida says it is qualification enough. At any rate, Bernstein bases his argument on a quote that he pulls from one context in which Derrida is discussing the State’s lack of both the right and the power to forgive and attempts to apply it to Derrida’s discussion of decision and responsibility. It seems to be a rather weak basis.

Bernstein’s basic critique of Derrida is that Derrida “does not do full justice to what is involved in difficult decisions – the role of deliberation and judgment” and that he moves to quickly to an “unwarranted Either/Or” (404). As Bernstein see it, Derrida is saying: “Either we think of our decisions as completely justified by the appeal to some knowledge, some rule, some calculation or we think of decision as involving possible aporias” (404). He agrees with Derrida that the first is unsatisfactory, but thinks that Derrida, by rejecting the “either,” accepts the “or” by matter of course. Bernstein argues that we should reject the Either/Or because it “mystifies” deliberation and judgment which are required to make responsible decisions. He then suggests that the inherited concepts of reflective judgment and phronesis would help “illuminate” what Derrida “mystifies” with his appeal to aporias and that they would help “illuminate” what “Derrida himself calls ‘negotiation’ when he speaks of negotiating between unconditional and conditional forgiveness” (404). He even sometimes thinks that Derrida might “fully agree” with him. Whether or not Derrida would “fully agree,” I cannot say. I think he would agree, mutatis mutandis. At any rate, if Bernstein thinks, as I mentioned above, that the “difficulties” he locates in Derrida’s understanding of forgiveness “reverberate throughout his thinking,” then perhaps he should look to some of Derrida’s other reflections in which he engages such difficulties. To begin, Bernstein should look at “The Force of Law,” where Derrida explicitly engages the role of judgment, knowledge, and deliberation in the aporetic experience (cf Derrida’s Acts of Religion, 251-258). Also, he should look to Derrida’s “Préjugés: Devant la loi” in La Faculté de juger (an earlier version of which is translated as “Before the Law” in Acts of Literature) in which he discusses judgment and phronesis in relation to Lyotard. He could also read chapter 5 of John Caputo’s Against Ethics, entitled “The Epoch of Judgment,” in which Caputo discusses Derrida’s understanding of judgment and offers a deconstruction of phronesis.

It seems that Bernstein’s argument that Derrida does not do full justice to decision and responsibility because he neglects the role of judgment and deliberation is based on a reading that doesn’t do full justice to Derrida.

To blog or not to blog

2008-11-23T20:48:00.002-05:00

Maybe I'll start blogging again.
I am working on a dissertation proposal (mostly in my head and on a few sheets of paper right now) on the concept of forgiveness. Maybe I'll post some thoughts from that on here and hopefully you will help me with some feedback.
Sorry I haven't posted in so long. I haven't had the internet at my compartment (it's a small apartment) for the past 2 1/2 years. However, I am moving from Toronto to Grand Rapids, MI in 3 weeks and will have internet again. But I guess the real question is: will I have the motivation again?
I guess we'll see.
I doubt anyone still checks this, but if you do, let me know.

Jesus for President

2007-11-28T12:52:00.000-05:00

"A different kind of campaign. A different kind of party. A different kind of Commander in Chief."

Jesus for President? No, it's not the Billy Bragg & Wilco song, that's "Christ for President."
Rather, "Jesus for President" is a summer 2008 tour and the title of a forthcoming book by Shane Claiborne and Chris Haw (Zondervan, 2008. It also will include a "Litany of Resistance" created by Claiborne and Haw with the help of Jim Loney (CPT Reservist) and Brian Walsh (activist theologian) as an appendix).
It looks interesting. The title has me a little nervous, I am interested in what they mean by "Jesus for President." Would Jesus run for president? Also the online summary of Section 4 of the book reads, "the question is not are we political, but how are we political" which sounds vaguely familiar to a quote from Hauerwas and Willimon's "Resident Aliens." I am concerned about what they mean by "political" and what they would put forward as to "how" we should be political.
I guess I'll have to wait until the book comes out, but, as I said, it looks interesting. Check out the website and let me know what you think.

God and Morality

2007-08-20T21:09:00.000-04:00

It is my contention that Christians should understand God as neither the sole author of a morality they must passively and slavishly obey, nor as being removed from the activity of moral reflection altogether.

The Hawk and the Dove: Some Thoughts on Just War and Pacifism

2007-02-21T14:36:00.000-05:00

1. It seems that in Just War Theory particulars are subsumed under some general rule. For Just War Theory, for a war to be just it must align to the general rule that usually consists of comparative justice (injustice suffered by one party must outweigh the injustice suffered by another), right intention (force can be used only for a just cause), legitimate authority (public authorities), probability of success (those waging a just war must have a high probability of "winning"), proportionality (the good must outweigh the destruction), and last resort (just war is only an option after other alternatives are exhausted). To subsume particular instances under this general rule is what Kant, in the Critique of Judgment, calls "Determinate Judgment". The criteria of the general rule of Just War seem neat and tidy until you try to apply them to particular instances. The general rule does not easily map onto particular instances.

2. Whose justice are we referring to when we say that something is just or not? Every war has been just, in the sense that everyone who has gone to war has in some way justified it, and has viewed it as just. Did Hitler see WWII as a just war? He was a legitimate authority. He thought that the good (German Lebensraum) would outweigh the bad (Holocaust). There was high probability of "success". He thought that he had the "right intention". He thought it was just. We do not.
Is the Iraq war "just"? For Bush, Iraqi freedom and democracy is a right intention. Bush thought there was a high probability of "winning". He thought the good (freedom and democracy) would outweigh the bad (Hussein's continual reign). Bush is a legitimate authority. Is the war just? Bush thinks so. I do not.
Particular instances are not so easily subsumed to general rules.

3. If war is an option, will all other options be tried first? It seems that if a nation goes to war, then it has not tried all other possible options. If war is a last resort, it seems that in the end we will become frustrated with other options and instead move right to this so-called "last resort" which isn't the failure of all other alternatives but is instead the failure of imagination. It seems to me that Just War theory is not so much concerned with justice, but is instead a theory of just war in the sense of only war.

4. Just War theory seems to employ the escape clause of "if nonviolence fails, try violence." If war is a last resort then one is "still enmeshed in the belief that violence saves" and still trusts domination and violence to bring justice and peace. You cannot fight fire with fire. You cannot fornicate for chastity. You cannot put an end to violence and domination by being violent and domineering. Peace and Justice have never been, nor will ever be, the result of war.

5. Pacifism seems to be a reflective judgment. A reflective judgment for Kant is a general rule that is derived from the particular. In pacifism, a general rule can be perceived in particular instances. We see examples in the particular instances of Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr. Examples, for Kant, are particular instances that contain in themselves, or is supposed to contain, a concept or a general rule. These instances have exemplary validity. But still, you cannot take these examples that have become general rules and map them onto every particular instance. Ghandi as an example cannot be directly used as a way to inform our response to Hussein's murders in Dujail. This example requires further imagination. A general rule of nonviolence must be reworked when applied to particular instances.

6. Pacifism is not to be confused with passivity. Passivity is not the root word of pacifism. Pacifism is not passifism. Passivity is inactivity. Pacific (the root word of pacifism) is an activity, a making or preserving of peace. Pacifism is probably more active than war. Pacifism is about peaceableness and peaceableness is a way of life. Peace is not the result of war, but is instead the result of peaceableness.

7. Through the prism of war, peace is simply the time between wars. Through the prism of peace, peace is only possible if we live peaceably.

Romans 13, Black History Month, and Wine Before Breakfast

2007-02-04T16:46:00.000-05:00

As I am finishing up my papers, I have lacked all motivation to write new posts. Actually that's not really true. I lack motivation to write my papers, so instead I post. But I post blogs that are not really blogs. They have been exercises that I have been tagged to do, so they don't really take too much time. I can't justify writing a new post while I should be writing my papers, but since I lack the motivation to write the papers, I post to waste time but they aren't really blogs so I can justify writing them. Does that make any sense? It does to me.

So onto the blog that is not a blog, a post with/out posting.

I recently recieved a new email from Stu, who periodically sends around emails to the ICS community to share what will be discussed at the upcoming "Wine Before Breakfast," a weekly Bible study that gathers on Tuesday mornings at 7:30 am in the Wycliffe Chapel under the superintendence of Brian Walsh. I have never been to "Wine Before Breakfast" as I am not a morning person (at least not a 7:30-in-the-morning person). However, the email that was sent around this week is an email from Brian Walsh who will be preaching this week on Romans 13 and Black History Month. I found the email to be very interesting, so I decided to include it here and see if it would warrant any responses.

So here's the question: how many folks out there think that we should bring back slavery? What? No hands at all? Ok, let's try another question: how many of you think that "every personshould be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authorityexcept from God, and those authorities that exist have been instituted byGod."(Hmm sounds like St. Paul, so I should put up my hand, but there's something about that question following the first question that's got me worried ) Come on, come on who thinks that every person should be subject to thegoverning authorities because all such authority is instituted by God? Somehands up, some half up, some down, a lot of perplexed and worried looks out there. Alright, let's put it this way. Here at the beginning of Black History monthhow many of us would want to say that black slaves and their helpers alongthe underground railroad should have obeyed the authorities because theywere instituted by God and not opposed slavery? I mean really, is there anyamongst us who would dare suggest such a thing? I doubt it.So let's put it another way. If a duly appointed leader lies to the peopleand then sends thousands of his own citizens to fight a war on falsepretense and to kill and injure many thousands of people in another land,then do we really believe that such a leader acts on an authority institutedby God? Do we really believe that we should be subject to such a deceitfuland murderous leader? And if we don't think that such a leader should receive our loyalty, thenwhat do we do with Paul's injunctions about governmental authority in Romans13?

i'm important and people like me

2007-02-01T21:20:00.000-05:00

I have been tagged by Evan (again)! Here's what I'm suppose to do:
1) Grab the book closest to you.
2) Open to page 123; go down to the fourth sentence.
3) Post the text of the following three sentences.
4) Name the author and book title.
5) Tag three people to do the same.

"And then the interesting justification: 'For thus you would rob and steal your body from your master, which he has bought or otherwise acquired, after which it is not your property but his, like a beast or other goods in his possession.' Here, therefore, certain worldly property and power relationships are made the justification of a state of unfreedom in which even the total abandonment of the Christian to the unbeliever is of subordinate importance to the preservation of these property relationships.
"With the emergence of the independence of worldly authority, and its reifications, the breach of this authority, rebellion and disobedience, becomes a social sin pure and simple, a 'greater sin than murder, unchastity, theft, dishonesty and all that goes with them.'"

The text comes from Herbert Marcuse's "A Study on Authority: Luther, Calvin, Kant", in The Frankfurt School on Religion. The first quote within the text comes from Luther's On War Against the Turk. The second comes from Luther's Treatise on Good Works.

Now I tag 3 people to do the same:
I tag Sara, M&Y, and Jeff

Tag, I'm it.

2007-01-23T23:59:00.000-05:00

I read Evan's blog. That means that I have been tagged to share 5 interesting or unique things about myself that you may not know. I'm actually pretty boring, so I'm not very interesting nor unique, so this may be somewhat difficult.

1. I have a mini fridge. Magnetically held to this mini fridge are two finger puppets, two images graven in the likeness of Friedrich Nietzsche and Fyodor Dostoevsky. They often have conversations concerning whether Raskolnikov from Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment is an übermensch or if he is all-too-human. When they start to discuss this, I usually try to direct the conversation toward either the similarities between Woody Allen's Crimes and Misdemeanors (and Match Point) and Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment or whether Paul Dano's character "Dwayne" in Little Miss Sunshine is an übermensch just because he doesn't speak (I say no, because he still has desires that are communicated). So that's interesting.

2. Flying doesn't make my arms tired. I flew for the first time on Sunday January, 14. I found that, despite popular opinion, flying does not make my arms tired.

3. I have a towel that is brown on one half and white on the other. The brown side is adorned with the word "BUTT" in big white letters, while the white side has the word "FACE" in big brown letters. This towel is to ensure that once you are out of the shower you do not dry your face with the same part of the towel that you dry your butt with. I think it is an ingenious invention and I thank my Aunt and Uncle for gifting in to me for my birthday. Now I can leave all worries behind while I dry off after a shower.

4. I like to put peanuts in my Coke. It's good, try it.

5. Thursday is laundry day. I get up in the morning and put all of my dirty clothes and my laundry detergent into my army bag and walk to the laundry mat. I fill two loads and pay the $1.50 per load. Then I walk down the road to Big Fat Burrito and get a 12 inch steak burrito. After I finish the burrito, I return to the laundry mat to put my laundry in the dryer. I then venture out again and do my grocery shopping. I usually buy sourdough bread, cheddar cheese, broccoli, apples, blueberries, and milk for the week. I put all of this in my army bag and walk it home, where I then, after putting all of my groceries in their proper place, exchange my bag for my clothes basket. Subsequently, I return to the laundry mat to remove my clothes from the dryer, fold them, and place them into my laundry basket for the return trip home. When I arrive back home, I put the clothes in their proper places and then sit on my butt for the remainder of the day.

I told you that I was uninteresting and lack uniquetitude.

(In)Justice is Served:Killing for Justice is like Screwing for Virginity?

2006-12-30T13:04:00.000-05:00

At 6:10 this morning (Dec. 30, 2006), Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq for 3 decades, was executed by hanging for the 1982 killings of 148 men and boys in the Iraqi town of Dujail. In a statment, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said: “To you who have endured the anguish of the years, and suffered from the injustice of the tyrants during the era of odious dictatorship, your pure land has gotten rid of impurity of the dictator.” In a statement prepared in advance, George W. Bush (who was sleeping at the time of the execution) said that Hussein “was executed after receiving a fair trial — the kind of justice he denied the victims of his brutal regime.” He continued: “Saddam Hussein’s execution comes at the end of a difficult year for the Iraqi people and for our troops...Bringing Saddam Hussein to justice will not end the violence in Iraq, but it is an important milestone on Iraq’s course to becoming a democracy that can govern, sustain and defend itself, and be an ally in the war on terror.”
I wish to draw attention to the rhetoric of "justice" and "injustice" in these two men's statements. To whose notion of justice does such an act of execution align? How are they describing "justice" and what does it mean to have "[brought] Saddam Hussein to justice"?
In one sense, "justice" seems to be described in the sense that Thrasymachus described it in The Republic, as the interest of the strong. Those in power make the rules, might makes right. Now that there are new people in power, these killings are viewed as unjust. Also with new people in power, and backed by the USA as a superpower, the execution of Hussein is viewed as just, because those in power judge them as just. This may be a good description of of what is politically called justice but I wouldn't want to hold this up as normative, as something that we should strive toward.
The execution itself is seen as being just by those in power, but this sense of justice seems to go along with the assumption that justice is getting what you deserve (and what you deserve is decided by those in power). Saddam Hussein had 148 men and boys killed at Dujail, therefore he deserves to die.
My question is this: can the hanging of Hussein be viewed as just? Instead of stopping the body count at 148 , it is now at 149. Are the injustices done by Hussein made right through further injustice? Do two injustices make justice prevail? Is justice a zero-sum game? Basically, can killing a human being serve justice?

Jesus, Son of the Father

2006-12-09T17:49:00.000-05:00

"Now it was the governor's custom at the Festival to release a prisoner chosen by the crowd. At that time they had a well-known prisoner whose name was Jesus Barabbas. So when the crowd had gathered, Pilate asked them, 'Which one do you want me to release to you: Jesus Barabbas, or Jesus who is called the Messiah?'"
Matthew 27:15-17
(for the parallel stories in the canonical gospels see also Mark 15:6-15, Luke 23:13-25, and John 18:38-19:16)

In this passage, there are (at least) three things that make me suspicious of a "literal" reading of this event of Jesus' Passion week. The first two are more historical, though they implications in the third which is more theological. First, nowhere other than the New Testament do we see any evidence that "it was the governor's custom at the Festival to release a prisoner chosen by the crowd." Second, historically (though little is known) Pontius Pilate was not considered a nice guy, as he is often portrayed in the canonical gospels. For example, according to Josephus, in approximately 36CE, Pilate attempted to suppress what appears to have been a Samaritan religious procession in arms that may have been interpreted as an uprising, by arresting and executing the Samaritans. Pilate's behavior was so offensive to the morals of the time that, after complaints to the Roman legate of Syria, Pilate was recalled to Rome, where he disappears from historic record. Third, and this is my big question, are Jesus Barabbas and Jesus the Messiah one and the same? In most manuscripts, we just read the name of the prisoner as "Barabbas", however, in a few manuscripts and the discussion of this passage by Origen, Barabbas is refered to as "Jesus Barabbas". The name Jesus Barabbas means Jesus, Son of the Father. Jesus the Messiah was often called Son of the Father. Are these seemingly distinct men really the same man? It seems odd that the crowd that ushered Jesus into the city as a king at the beginning of the week, all of a sudden wants him crucified. Perhaps, there was only one man, Pilate was afraid of a riot, so he asked if they wanted Jesus (the son of the Father, the messiah) set free. They responded by saying set Jesus (the son of the Father, the messiah) free, Pilate agreed and the crowd dispersed. Then Pilate had Jesus crucified anyway for his crimes of sedition.

Maybe.

R.S.V.P.: A Letter from Mahmoud Amhadinejad to the American People

2006-11-30T12:49:00.000-05:00

Message of H.E. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
To the American People
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
O, Almighty God, bestow upon humanity the perfect human being promised to all by You, and make us among his followers.

Noble Americans,
Were we not faced with the activities of the US administration in this part of the world and the negative ramifications of those activities on the daily lives of our peoples, coupled with the many wars and calamities caused by the US administration as well as the tragic consequences of US interference in other countries; Were the American people not God-fearing, truth-loving, and justice-seeking, while the US administration actively conceals the truth and impedes any objective portrayal of current realities; And if we did not share a common responsibility to promote and protect freedom and human dignity and integrity; Then, there would have been little urgency to have a dialogue with you.
While Divine providence has placed Iran and the United States geographically far apart, we should be cognizant that human values and our common human spirit, which proclaim the dignity and exalted worth of all human beings, have brought our two great nations of Iran and the United States closer together. Both our nations are God-fearing, truth-loving and justice-seeking, and both seek dignity, respect and perfection.
Both greatly value and readily embrace the promotion of human ideals such as compassion, empathy, respect for the rights of human beings, securing justice and equity, and defending the innocent and the weak against oppressors and bullies.
We are all inclined towards the good, and towards extending a helping hand to one another, particularly to those in need. We all deplore injustice, the trampling of peoples’ rights and the intimidation and humiliation of human beings. We all detest darkness, deceit, lies and distortion, and seek and admire salvation, enlightenment, sincerity and honesty. The pure human essence of the two great nations of Iran and the United States testify to the veracity of these statements.
Noble Americans,
Our nation has always extended its hand of friendship to all other nations of the world. Hundreds of thousands of my Iranian compatriots are living amongst you in friendship and peace, and are contributing positively to your society. Our people have been in contact with you over the past many years and have maintained these contacts despite the unnecessary restrictions of US authorities. As mentioned, we have common concerns, face similar challenges, and are pained by the sufferings and afflictions in the world.
We, like you, are aggrieved by the ever-worsening pain and misery of the Palestinian people. Persistent aggressions by the Zionists are making life more and more difficult for the rightful owners of the land of Palestine. In broad daylight, in front of cameras and before the eyes of the world, they are bombarding innocent defenseless civilians, bulldozing houses, firing machine guns at students in the streets and alleys, and subjecting their families to endless grief. No day goes by without a new crime.
Palestinian mothers, just like Iranian and American mothers, love their children, and are painfully bereaved by the imprisonment, wounding and murder of their children. What mother wouldn’t?
For 60 years, the Zionist regime has driven millions of the inhabitants of Palestine out of their homes. Many of these refugees have died in the Diaspora and in refugee camps. Their children have spent their youth in these camps and are aging while still in the hope of returning to homeland.
You know well that the US administration has persistently provided blind and blanket support to the Zionist regime, has emboldened it to continue its crimes, and has prevented the UN Security Council from condemning it. Who can deny such broken promises and grave injustices towards humanity by the US administration?
Governments are there to serve their own people. No people wants to side with or support any oppressors. But regrettably, the US administration disregards even its own public opinion and remains in the forefront of supporting the trampling of the rights of the Palestinian people.
Let’s take a look at Iraq. Since the commencement of the US military presence in Iraq, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have been killed, maimed or displaced. Terrorism in Iraq has grown exponentially. With the presence of the US military in Iraq, nothing has been done to rebuild the ruins, to restore the infrastructure or to alleviate poverty. The US Government used the pretext of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but later it became clear that that was just a lie and a deception.
Although Saddam was overthrown and people are happy about his departure, the pain and suffering of the Iraqi people has persisted and has even been aggravated.
In Iraq, about one hundred and fifty thousand American soldiers, separated from their families and loved ones, are operating under the command of the current US administration. A substantial number of them have been killed or wounded and their presence in Iraq has tarnished the image of the American people and government.
Their mothers and relatives have, on numerous occasions, displayed their discontent with the presence of their sons and daughters in a land thousands of miles away from US shores. American soldiers often wonder why they have been sent to Iraq.
I consider it extremely unlikely that you, the American people, consent to the billions of dollars of annual expenditure from your treasury for this military misadventure.
Noble Americans,
You have heard that the US administration is kidnapping its presumed opponents from across the globe and arbitrarily holding them without trial or any international supervision in horrendous prisons that it has established in various parts of the world. God knows who these detainees actually are, and what terrible fate awaits them.
You have certainly heard the sad stories of the Guantanamo and Abu-Ghraib prisons. The US administration attempts to justify them through its proclaimed “war on terror.” But every one knows that such behavior, in fact, offends global public opinion, exacerbates resentment and thereby spreads terrorism, and tarnishes the US image and its credibility among nations.
The US administration’s illegal and immoral behavior is not even confined to outside its borders. You are witnessing daily that under the pretext of “the war on terror,” civil liberties in the United States are being increasingly curtailed. Even the privacy of individuals is fast losing its meaning. Judicial due process and fundamental rights are trampled upon. Private phones are tapped, suspects are arbitrarily arrested, sometimes beaten in the streets, or even shot to death. I have no doubt that the American people do not approve of this behavior and indeed deplore it.
The US administration does not accept accountability before any organization, institution or council. The US administration has undermined the credibility of international organizations, particularly the United Nations and its Security Council. But, I do not intend to address all the challenges and calamities in this message.
The legitimacy, power and influence of a government do not emanate from its arsenals of tanks, fighter aircrafts, missiles or nuclear weapons. Legitimacy and influence reside in sound logic, quest for justice and compassion and empathy for all humanity. The global position of the United States is in all probability weakened because the administration has continued to resort to force, to conceal the truth, and to mislead the American people about its policies and practices. Undoubtedly, the American people are not satisfied with this behavior and they showed their discontent in the recent elections. I hope that in the wake of the mid-term elections, the administration of President Bush will have heard and will heed the message of the American people.
My questions are the following:
Is there not a better approach to governance?
Is it not possible to put wealth and power in the service of peace, stability, prosperity and the happiness of all peoples through a commitment to justice and respect for the rights of all nations, instead of aggression and war?
We all condemn terrorism, because its victims are the innocent. But, can terrorism be contained and eradicated through war, destruction and the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocents?
If that were possible, then why has the problem not been resolved? The sad experience of invading Iraq is before us all.
What has blind support for the Zionists by the US administration brought for the American people? It is regrettable that for the US administration, the interests of these occupiers supersedes the interests of the American people and of the other nations of the world.
What have the Zionists done for the American people that the US administration considers itself obliged to blindly support these infamous aggressors? Is it not because they have imposed themselves on a substantial portion of the banking, financial, cultural and media sectors?
I recommend that in a demonstration of respect for the American people and for humanity, the right of Palestinians to live in their own homeland should be recognized so that millions of Palestinian refugees can return to their homes and the future of all of Palestine and its form of government be determined in a referendum. This will benefit everyone.
Now that Iraq has a Constitution and an independent Assembly and Government, would it not be more beneficial to bring the US officers and soldiers home, and to spend the astronomical US military expenditures in Iraq for the welfare and prosperity of the American people? As you know very well, many victims of Katrina continue to suffer, and countless Americans continue to live in poverty and homelessness.
I’d also like to say a word to the winners of the recent elections in the US: The United States has had many administrations; some who have left a positive legacy, and others that are neither remembered fondly by the American people nor by other nations.
Now that you control an important branch of the US Government, you will also be held to account by the people and by history
If the US Government meets the current domestic and external challenges with an approach based on truth and Justice, it can remedy some of the past afflictions and alleviate some of the global resentment and hatred of America. But if the approach remains the same, it would not be unexpected that the American people would similarly reject the new electoral winners, although the recent elections, rather than reflecting a victory, in reality point to the failure of the current administration’s policies. These issues had been extensively dealt with in my letter to President Bush earlier this year.
To sum up:
It is possible to govern based on an approach that is distinctly different from one of coercion, force and injustice.
It is possible to sincerely serve and promote common human values, and honesty and compassion.
It is possible to provide welfare and prosperity without tension, threats, imposition or war.
It is possible to lead the world towards the aspired perfection by adhering to unity, monotheism, morality and spirituality and drawing upon the teachings of the Divine Prophets.
Then, the American people, who are God-fearing and followers of Divine religions, will overcome every difficulty.
What I stated represents some of my anxieties and concerns.
I am confident that you, the American people, will play an instrumental role in the establishment of justice and spirituality throughout the world. The promises of the Almighty and His prophets will certainly be realized, Justice and Truth will prevail and all nations will live a true life in a climate replete with love, compassion and fraternity.
The US governing establishment, the authorities and the powerful should not choose irreversible paths. As all prophets have taught us, injustice and transgression will eventually bring about decline and demise. Today, the path of return to faith and spirituality is open and unimpeded.
We should all heed the Divine Word of the Holy Qur’an:
“But those who repent, have faith and do good may receive Salvation. Your Lord, alone, creates and chooses as He will, and others have no part in His choice; Glorified is God and Exalted above any partners they ascribe to Him.” (28:67-68)
I pray to the Almighty to bless the Iranian and American nations and indeed all nations of the world with dignity and success.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
29 November 2006

The Phonograph and My Existential Crisis

2006-11-29T00:31:00.000-05:00

Today, November 29th, 2006 (the 333rd day of 2006) is the 119th anniversary of the day that Thomas Edison first demonstrated his invention for recording and replaying sound, the phonograph ("sound writer"). This first phonograph recorded on tinfoil cylinders that had low sound quality and destroyed the track during replay so that one could listen to it only a few times. A few uses for the phonograph that Edison proposed include: recording books for blind people to hear, preserving the last words of dying people, announcing the time, and teaching spelling. The reproduction of music was not very high on Edison's list. A few years past without the phonograph really catching on, and eventually Edison proclaimed that the phonograph had no commercial value. After a few more years, Edison changed his mind and began selling phonographs as office dictating machines. However, other inventors wanted to take the phonograph in a different direction and they created jukeboxes by arranging phonographs to play popular music at the drop of a coin. Edison saw this as a debasement of his serious invention. Eventually, after 20 years, Edison conceded that the phonograph's purpose is to record and play music. I do not claim to be an expert on Edison's life, but it seems to me that he began inventing because he enjoyed inventing. It seems to me that he made money in order to continue what he loved to do; invent. He survived to continue inventing. As the years went on, however, his love seemed to change. With his improvement of the incandescent light bulb, Edison was a promoter of DC (direct current) for electric distribution. He went to extremes to put his new adversary, George Westinghouse, out of business. Westinghouse was a promoter of AC (alternating current). Edison went so far as to electracute animals, including an elephant, to show the "danger" of AC. He even went so far as promoting the electric chair and the death penalty to delegitimate AC. I don't want to go into the details, but it seems that Edison's focus shifted here, from making money in order to continue inventing to continue inventing in order to make money. (I don't really care if this isn't exactly true. This story about Edison is merely a means to an end, and I feel that the end justifies the means, at least in this blog post.)And this is the point that my existential crisis arises. What do I want to do? What do I want to survive in order to keep doing? Instead of keep doing in order to survive? What do I want to do that I will make money to continue doing and not continue doing in order to make money? This is where I am stuck. Especially since I have become rather disenchanted with graduate school (apparently reading Habermas will do that to you). So here I am crossing the threshold into the yet-to-be determined future, and as I do, I am trying to find my passion in life. Because right now, I am growing evermore passionate about apathy.

Natality and the Detroit Tigers

2006-10-09T18:09:00.000-04:00

The Detroit Tigers are appearing in the MLB playoffs for the first time since 1987 (I was 5 years old). Since winning the division title in '87, the team had a sucessful year in '88 leading the AL East for most of the season before entering a late season slump. In '89, the Tigers held the worst record in baseball with a 59-103 record. In '90 - '93, the team began to improve thanks to Fielder's bat, but the team lacked pitching and the players were beginning to age. From '94-'05, the Tigers did not post a winning record.
However, this year, 2006, the Tigers have made it at least to the American League Championship Series.
The '06 Tigers are a young team. With the likes of Granderson (MLB debut in '04), Monroe (MLB debut '01), Thames (MLB debut '02), Verlander (rookie), Zumaya (rookie), Bonderman (MLB debut '03), Robertson (MLB debut '02), Maroth (MLB debut '02), and Miner (rookie) among others, the Tigers are a team that may be less experienced than other teams, but "every newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew."
This reminds me of Hannah Arendt's notion of natality (contra Heidegger's notion of mortality). Arendt writes of the "human condition of natality" is "the new beginning inherent in birth [that] can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew".
"The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, 'natural' ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is ontologically rooted. It is, in other words, the birth of new men and the new beginning, the action they are capable of by virtue of being born. Only the full experience of this capacity can bestow upon human affairs faith and hope...It is this faith in and hope for the world that found perhaps its most glorious and most succinct expression in the few words with which the Gospels announced their 'glad tidings': 'A child has been born unto us.'"
These newcomers on the Tigers give me faith and hope and they have brought and are capable of bringing new beginnings to my favorite baseball team. Let's go Tigers!

With Dick in Hand: Dick Devos, Michigan, and Economic Masturbation

2006-10-05T20:39:00.000-04:00

With mid-term elections coming up on November 7, I'm sure the gubernatorial elections in America's high five (Michigan) are becoming more and more ominous and the reminders to vote are increasing toward ubiquity. Thankfully, I am in Toronto and no one will be riding me for not voting and then telling me that since I don't vote, I can't complain. First, if you vote for a candidate or a proposition, and said candidate or proposition loses, what good is it to have "a right to complain"? Exactly who do you complain to? Why do I have to have a "right" in order to complain? Do people under 21 have no right to complain? If in good conscience you can't vote for any candidate in a presidential election, it would seem that you have legitimate grounds for complaint.
Secondly, I'm not a political romantic. America, Michigan, and Grant Township will always do things that I disagree with whether I vote or not. You can't say you are politically active simply because you fill in a dot next to someone's name. But because you filled in that dot and I didn't, you have the right to complain and I don't? Politics aren't going to change the world for the better. Get off your tuckus more than just to travel down to the polls and actually do something to change the world. Ways of life only change in living...and it begins at home. Because politics aren't going to change the world for the better and, if even it could, there is no one I can support and still sleep at night, I'm not going to vote and I think I have the "right" to complain.
Sorry about the pseudo-rant, I'm sure I will be lambasted by the "politically-aware" readers (oh, I forgot, no one reads this blog anymore).
My actual intent for this post was to talk about Dick Devos and his "The Michigan Turn Around Plan". So, basically, said plan can be (and has been by Devos himself) divided into four sections or "missions" (which are actually one "mission", but enough of these parenthetical statements); 1) Create a Job Climate Second to None, 2) Overhaul State Government, 3) Diversify our Economy, and 4) Conquer the International Marketplace.
Let's begin at the beginning. Dick Devos wants to create a job climate second to none. How (besides getting rid of the Business Tax), you ask? I'll focus on a few "jobs" that Devos says he hopes to do. I'll start off with one I like, Mission #1 Job#2 focuses on helping small businesses. Which I like, but helping them how? Implicitly, it seems that he wants to "help" small businesses by making them big businesses. Nevermind, I don't like it anymore.
Mission #1 Job #2 - Devos wants to "Improve Education: Give Our Kids the Skills They Need". I agree. Improve education and give them the skills they need! Right on! Wait a minute. Devos is reducing education to economics. Give them the skills they need so that they "are able to meet the requirements of the 21st Century economy - and get high quality jobs." But if everyone is getting this "improved education", can everyone get these "high quality jobs"? Who is going to bag groceries or clean toilets? We are already keeping kid's from flooding the job market by keeping them in school until they are 18. What would happen if they get the high quality jobs when they are finally released into the job market? What would happen to all the people who are, in the job market, obtaining the skills they need and working their way up to those jobs?
Mission #1 Job #5 - Protect and Promote Michigan's Environment. Sounds good. Again, I agree. But why Mr. Devos? "I believe our environment is an engine for job creation and quality of life." This is the point where I hang my head.
Let's move to Mission #2, "Overhaul State Government". You may be thinking of that good ol' Sesame Street (ADD-inducing) shorts and singing to yourself, "one of these things is not like the others". The other three are about the economy, this one is about the government. But you would be wrong because "The Governor's Job is Jobs" and as our Governor, "Devos would be the CEO of Michigan's economic efforts."
Maybe we should move along to Mission #3 - "Diversify our Economy". Here he talks of universities, but again he is only interested in how it will help the economy; "I will get more job-creating ideas from our universities to the marketplace."
In Job #14, Devos wants to "Support Michigan Agriculture" and he "knows that we can
protect the environment and grow Michigan’s family farms at the same time." I like what I hear. Wait...what does he mean by "grow"? What is all this talk of "Agriculture business leaders will always have a seat at my table" and "agriculture industry" and "Michigan’s agriculture businesses"? I thought we were talking about Michigan's family farms not Michigan's agribusinesses?
I don't even want to talk about Mission #4 - "Conquer the International Marketplace". It just sounds ridiculous. But he talks about Fair Trade in Job #17, my interest is peaked. "Enforce trade agreements. Michigan workers can compete anywhere, but we need a level playing
field. When these agreements are not enforced, our job providers struggle, and we lose jobs"... "Stand up to countries whose laws discriminate against American-made products"... "Fight for the protection of intellectual property rights"..."Stop currency manipulation that harms our Michigan made products." What does this have to do with doing justice to those who are mistreated because of their status as a farmer in a periphery country being trammeled by the global capitalist economy?

It seems that Dick Devos believes two things. 1. Everything (education, agriculture, government, the environment...etc.) is a means to the end of "stimulating" the economy. 2. If the economy is being "stimulated", then everything is working as it should be. This may be too simplistic, but I don't care. I'm glad that I can complain. All I'm saying is that when I come home I don't want to catch you all with Dick in Hand "stimulating" the economy.

German

2006-10-04T23:24:00.000-04:00

Apparently no one checks my blog anymore, but I don't really care. If I keep writing posts on this blog, is it like talking to myself? If it is, I don't really care.
Anyway, I started learning how to read German last Wednesday. Today, I had my second German class. I've had a great time learing Nominative, Accusative, Genitive, and Dative cases, and the corresponding articles for Masculine, Feminine, Neutral, and Plural. Anyway (again), German is a weird language (but its not like English isn't weird). It seems that Germans don't like to use the space bar or move their hand over between nouns. These are called compound nouns. One such compound noun I learned this week was (are you ready for this?)..."staatsangestelltenkrankheitsversicherungsgesellschaft". Yes, that's one word! It means: State Employees health insurance company, and yes, it has 55 letters!
What is it with Germans and spaces? Do they not get along?

Christology with a Dash of Freud and a Pinch of Marx

2006-09-27T16:04:00.000-04:00

Here are some excerpts from Erich Fromm's essay "The Dogma of Christ" in The Frankfurt School on Religion and the collection of essays entitled The Dogma of Christ. This is an extremely interesting essay, Fromm employs two of the "Masters of Suspicion" to read (and critique) the doctrine of Christology for the early Church and later its shift away from the early Church's Christology to the Christology of the Catholic Church. Both doctrines of Christ are rooted in the Church communities' social and economic standings.
I want to include enough to interest people to read it, but not too much to give it all away. The parts that I focus on a Marxian reading of first century Palestine which sets up for a Freudian reading of the doctrine of Christ for the first century Christian community. Without further ado, dear reader, let's get started.
In the first century C.E., "Palestine was a part of the Roman Empire and succumbed to the conditions of its economic and social development".
Economically, there were basically three classes. First, "the rural population was exhausted by an extraordinarily heavy tax burden" and either became debt slaves, or as the farmers lost their means of production or their small land holdings, they "swelled the ranks of the large-city proletariat of Jerusalem" or "resorted to desperate remedies, such as violent political uprising and plundering." Second, just above the impoverished proletariat there arose a middle economic class, "though suffering under Roman pressure, was nevertheless economically stable." Third, there was a "small but powerful influential class of the feudal, priestly, and moneyed aristocracy." Within the Palestinian population, there was a corresponding social differentiation to this severe economic cleavage. Sadducees represented the rich upper class, Pharisees represented the middle economic class, and the Am Ha-aretz (literally, land folk), corresponded to the "lowest stratum of the urban Lumpenproletariat and the oppressed peasants." There was much hatred between the lowest class and the Pharisaic circles (if you question this, ask me for some literary instances where this arises), and the conflict increased as "Roman oppression became heavier and the lowest classes [became] more crushed and uprooted." This is where we see the rise of national, social, and religious revolutionaries; mainly embodied in political attempts at revolt like the Zealots and Sicarii (dagger carriers), and religious-messianic movements (but "there is by no means a sharp deperation between these two streams moving toward liberation and salvation; often they flow into each other).
Out of these lowest classes - "the masses of uneducated poor, the proletariat of Jerusalem, and the peasants in the country", those who "because of the increasing political and economic oppression and because of social restriction and contempt, increasingly felt the urge to change existing conditions" - arose the kind of people who supported early Christianity.
Do passages like Luke 6:20 ff, then, not only "express longing and expectation of the poor and oppressed for a new and better world, but also their complete hatred of the authorities - the rich, the learned, and the powerful"?
How did the early Christian community view Christ? In Acts 2:36, wee see that "God made him [Jesus] both Lord and Christ". This "is the oldest doctrine of Christ that we have, and is therefore of great interest, especially since it was later supplanted by other, more extensive doctrines." This is called the "adoptionist" theory "because here an act of adoption is assumed". "The thought present here is that Jesus was not the messiah from the beginning; in other words, he was not from the beginning the Son of God, but became so only by a definite, very distinct act of God's will. This is expressed in the fact that the statement in Psalms 2:7, 'You are my son, today I have begotten you," is interpreted as referring to the moment of the exaltation of Jesus (Acts 13:33)." According to the ancient Semetic idea, the king is a son of God on the day he mounts the throne. "It is therefore in keeping with the oriental spirit to say that Jesus, as he was exalted to the right hand of God, became the Son of God."
"We see thus that the concept of Jesus held by the early community was that he was a man chosen by God and elevated by him as a 'messiah', and later as 'Son of God'. This Christology of the early community resembles in many respects the concept of the messiah chosen by God to introduce a kingdom of righteousness and love, a concept which had been familiar among the Jewish masses for a long time." Except there are a few new elements: "in the fact of his exaltation as Son of God to sit at the right hand of the Almighty, and in the act that this messiah is no longer the powerful, victorious hero, but his significance and dignity reside just in his suffering, in his death on the cross."
This is where we add the dash of Freud, and may get a little controversial.
"The first Christians were a brotherhood of socially and economically oppressed enthusiasts held together by hope and hatred." "While the Zealots and Sicarii endeavored to realize their wishes in the sphere of political reality, the complete hopelessness of realization led the early Christians to formulate the same wishes in fantasy." "If there was nothing left for the Zealots but to die in hopeless battle, the followers of Christ could dream of their goal without reality immediately showing them the hopelessness of their wishes. By substituting fantasy for reality, the Christian message satisfied the longings for hope and revenge, and although it failed to relieve hunger, it brought a fantasy satisfaction of no little significance for the oppressed."
1. A man is rased to a god; he is adopted by God. "We have here the old myth of the rebellion of the son, an expression of hostile impulses toward the father-god." "These people hated intensely the authorities that confronted them with 'fatherly' power. The priests, scholars, aristocrates, in short, all the rulers who excluded them from the enjoyment of life and who in their emotional world played the role of the sever, forbidding, threatening, tormenting father - they also had to hate this God who was an ally of their oppressors, who permitted them to suffer and be oppressed. They themselves wanted to rul...but it seemed hopeless to try to acheive this in reality and to overthrow and destroy their present masters by force. So they satisfied their wishes in fantasy. Consciously they did not date to slander the fatherly God. Concious hatred was reserved for the authorities, not for the elevated father figure, the diving being himself. But the unconscious hostility to the divine father found expression in the Christ fantasy. They put a man at God's side and made him a co-regent with God the father. This man who became a god, and with whom as humans they could identify, represented their Oedipus wishes; he was a symbol of their unconscious hostility to God the father, for if a man could become God, the latter was deprived of his priveleged fatherly position of being unique and unreachable. The belief in the elevation of a man to god was thus the expression of an unconscious wish for the removal of the divine father.
2. The figure of the suffering savior was determined "by the fact that some of the death wishes against the father-god were shifted to the son. In the myth of the dying god (Adonis, Attis, Osiris), god himself was the one whose death was fantasied. In the early Christian myth the father is killed in the son."
3. "Since the believing enthusiasts were imbued with hatred and death wishes - consciously against their rulers, unconsciously against God the father - they identified with the crucified; they themselves suffered death on the cross and atoned in this way for their death wishes against the father. through his death, Jesus expiated the guilt of all, and the first Christians greatly needed such an atonement."

9/11: In Memoriam

2006-09-11T12:08:00.000-04:00

Prior to the commencement of his presidency, George W. Bush’s campaign slogan was “Bringing America Together”. Apparently, according to the Republican Party in general, and Bush in particular, the grand old U.S. of A. was experiencing a crisis of national identity. Whether there was an internal conflict of Us/Them in the United States or not, Bush’s dreams were answered at the precise moment that two planes crashed into the national monument known as the World Trade Center, five years ago. The “crises of national identity found its provisional resolution by displacing the internal conflict of Us/Them on an external screen.” (Richard Kearney) The body politic known as the United States was (re)united on September 11, 2001, just like the separatist Puritans and the non-religious adventurers were united under the Mayflower Compact or like how frontiersmen put there differences aside while expanding America’s borders westward. This time, however, “we” were not arriving to the New World on the Mayflower or pushing the frontier further west in stagecoaches or covered wagons and uniting against the savage “Indians”, instead, “they” were the savages arriving on airplanes, crashing into buildings, nevertheless, again we united against “them”. Our crises of national identity, our differences were put behind us; America had been brought together against “them”; against savage terrorists. We were once again the United States of America.
However, it was indeed a “provisional resolution”. Between the attack upon the World Trade Center and today, five years later, we have seen the Bush administration declare preemptive war on Iraq, declare an endless “war on terrorism”, curtail civil rights, defy laws, resort to overwhelming force, and other actions, like these, that are “ready products of fear and hasty thought.” (Wendell Berry) Again we are experiencing crises of national identity; Americans are no longer united over the issues of war in Iraq (how is this connected to 9/11 again?), war in Afghanistan, or war on terrorism. Words like “freedom” are evoked to reunite the body politic, because who is against “freedom”? Terrorists. This administration is fighting for “freedom” against those who are against “freedom”, so if you are against this administrations actions, you are against “freedom” (you are no better than a terrorist) because this administration is fighting for “freedom”. This logic disintegrates public dialogue into ad hominem arguments, words like “freedom” disintegrate into rhetoric of self-righteousness and self-justification, and critical self-appraisal is thrown out with the bathwater. We are implored to remember the victims aboard the planes and in the towers who died on this fateful day, but these are just disguised calls to revenge and resentment, to increase military funding (recall Eisenhower’s warning against the military-industrial complex), to give our endless support to the thriving bureaucracy, in order to stamp out these “embittered few”, these “thousands of trained terrorists” so “innocents” who died on 9/11 and others will not have died in vain (The National Security Strategy). But will retaliating in immature and dangerous ways, will the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of “innocents” in Iraq and Afghanistan, will the deaths of thousands of American, Canadian, English, Iraq, and Afghan soldiers, will the severed head of Osama bin-Laden, save the victims deaths from banality? It doesn’t look like America’s typical unoriginal and uncreative response of war and violence will save or is saving the victims death from be(com)ing trivial. Perhaps it is now, five years out, to start thinking of different ways to handle the crises that 9/11 has placed in our laps. When should we start forgiving? When is it right to remember and when is it right to forget? How much should we remember and how much should we forget? Is this a time and place (like Northern Ireland, Bosnia, or Rwanda) where we should take note of Nietzsche’s call to “actively forget the past” in order to surmount revenge and resentment? To rework Adorno’s question about Auschwitz (which he later retracted), “Is poetry possible after 9/11?” Or is this a time and place (like Auschwitz) in which “it is essential to remember the past in order to honour our ‘debt to the dead’ and try to insure that it never happens again” (Kearney)? If we are to remember the past, if we are to narrate the events of half a decade ago, how do we do so without “losing the unique character of unspeakable horror” (Kearney)? Let’s not follow the easy path of many Christians, both conservative and liberal, and create or subscribe to some Master Narrative that attempts to explain it away. 9/11 did not happen because God called down destruction on America because of homosexuals, or gay marriage, or whatever. We must avoid “banalising” it “by reducing it to voyeuristic spectacle or kitsh” (Kearney) or a commodity of the culture industry (a real and present danger with the appearance of numerous emotive 9/11 films).
Either way, we must take seriously both the September 11th attack on the Twin Towers and the dissent of the populace concerning the subsequent actions taken by the Bush administration in order to make occasion for strenuous self-appraisal. First, what has the United States done to stimulate such an attack? Could it be that we are trespassers in the Islamic holy land, not just Mecca, but the whole Saudi Arabian peninsula? Could it be because of the untrammeled spread of the global market leaving the Islamic people maimed in its path? Second, why are citizens dissenting? Obviously, some people aren’t pleased with the way this administration is handling things. Instead of hijacking, raping, and using religious vocabulary to justify your actions and arrogantly proclaiming the superiority of your stance while ignoring the critique, why not actually engage the critique and confront the disagreement? How could there possibly be a quandary if your stance and actions are divinely sanctioned? Displacing internal conflict onto an external screen is only a temporary cover-up for crises of national identity, attention cannot be diverted ad infinitum from the internal conflicts (though an endless war on terror was a creative attempt), eventually these crises will have to be dealt with.
If America is to be brought together, let it be brought together not by identifying outside enemies like America did in the 20th century with communists, fascists, Cubans, Iraqis, Vietcong, or North Koreans nor by trivializing the deaths of victims by using their deaths as a method to continually fuel the military-industrial machine to satiate our perceived need for revenge. Perhaps, it is time to think of new ways to “bring America together”. But first it is time to think of new descriptions as to what is meant by “America”, both ideally and in actual performance, or whether or not America should be “brought together” at all.

"Who Disturbs My Slumber? The Faces of Poor People, Ethical Obligation, and Différance

2006-09-04T12:29:00.000-04:00

No, the allusion to (actually, the direct quotation of) the magical sand tiger and the (literal) mouth of the “Cave of Wonders” in Disney’s Aladdin, who – subsequently to having those golden bug halves become his eyes and prior to his persistent goings on about a “diamond in the rough” – asks “Who disturbs my slumber?”, does not start this essay (article, blog post, whatever) out on the proverbial wrong foot with a confusion of pronouns. My (at least perceived) intent is not to address the abstract, universal notion of “poverty”, I would go so far as to say that I’m not really all that concerned with the problem of poverty. Now before I get in trouble, let me say that instead I am kept up at night by the one-legged, homeless Jamaican man who plays percussion on an upside down plastic trash can in hopes to insight some subjective pleasure in Chinatown/Spadina Street pedestrians to accumulate enough “spare” change to buy a decent lunch. Sure, he isn’t that good – Kant with his objective aesthetic judgment and his pockets full of Loonies and Toonies would just keep walking – but he is hungry. The woman who feeds the cats that hang around by my garbage cans, who built them a shelter out of a Styrofoam cooler, and asks them if they are going to catch pigeons, she too disturbs my sleep. She is probably homeless and most likely doesn’t have any food for herself. There is also the man in the jean jacket with the worn elbows who stands outside Burger King on College and Spadina everyday and asks everyone who passes if he can have money for a burger. Or the woman with the thick harlequin-esque makeup who smells like urine and walked me and Jeff all the way from Spadina to Bathurst mumbling incessantly, but seemed to enjoy a “listening” ear and the occasional affirmation to her incoherent mumblings. These people, these faces, keep me up at night. Not because I invite them all over to watch Spiderman cartoons in French on the Quebecois CBC station and then they can’t take a hint when midnight rolls around and I keep yawning and saying “well, it’s about that time”. They disturb my slumber because these are actual faces that are calling me, in some way, to relieve their suffering and I do not even now how to begin to respond. Therefore, the question is not “what disturbs my slumber?”, but precisely “who disturbs my slumber?”. These are, at least a few, who disturb my slumber.
It seems that différance is the im/possibility of everything (is différance also the im/possibility of différance making différance it’s own condition and therefore “unconditional” and metaphysical? (Dudiak’s critique of Caputo?)) . If this is the case, if différance is the im/possibility of everything, then différance is (always?) prior to any call (face/flesh) of the other that elicits my/our response and obligates me/us in their singularity (Levinas). This may be what Levinas is signifying when he says the other is “Absolutely Other” (however, can you have a relationship with an absolute? (Caputo’s critique of Levinas?)). If the other is always “Absolutely Other”, if différance is the im/possibility of ethics, how can I respond in such a way that relieves these faces from their suffering? It would seem that the typical response to the faces of those mentioned above is to give them money. But is this simply reducing them to the Same? By tossing them a Toonie am I simply assimilating them into the competitive market? Am I responding as a bourgeois, capitalist oppressor as if I can relieve their suffering by reducing them to the Same? Will the act of giving them some spare change relieve their suffering as singularities that call for a singular response? Is this what they want? Do they even know what they want? Do they want to be parasitic upon or be assimilated into a culture that locks up food and forces people to labor so an elite few can be “free” and “truly human” (*jab at Hannah Arendt*)?
I’m experiencing an existential crisis. First, these people I mentioned are poor and homeless. Their faces call me, place an obligation upon me, and I am responsible to respond. However, I must interpret this call. I am a bourgeois, capitalist oppressor who drank single malt scotch aged 12 years while typing this post full of obscure, philosophical references, and I will interpret this call from this place I find myself in, which normally elicits the response of giving money. They are poor because they are not like me, so I make them like me by giving them money. How can I respond otherwise? How can I respond to their call without reducing them to the Same? Which brings me to my second point. They are calling me to relieve their suffering. But they must also interpret their suffering. This is similar to the well-trodden authorial intent discussion. They may entertain private meanings inaccessible to anyone, but they may also have blind spots concerning their suffering and their call and their hoped-for response. They want to eat, maybe their suffering is more of an existential desire that they are looking to satiate, but if they could satiate it indefinitely by being assimilated into this culture would it be worth it? Is that what they really want?
Please respond, whether to my (mis?) readings of différance and ethical obligation, or to how I should respond to those who disturb my slumber.

Terrorism through the Prism of Peace

2006-08-28T16:59:00.000-04:00

Friends, Aquaintances, and Fellow Bloggers soujourning in the wild spaces of Blogdom,

Here is an interesting and much-needed interpretation of the United States' response to terrorism. Cortright sees the Bush administration as viewing all terrorism through the "prism of war" which leads to the killing of all militants to put the kibosh on the threat of terrorism. However, this tends to "[ignite] hatred and vengeance and creates a cycle of violence that can spin out of control." To quote Miroslav Volf (from memory), "Today's victims are tomorrow's perpetrators". Cortright critiques the Bush administration's response from a Ghandian perspective and proffers a "non violent strategy" that "seeks to reduce the appeal of militants’ extremist methods by addressing legitimate grievances and providing channels of political engagement for those who sympathize with the declared political aims." He believes "[a] two-step response is essential: determined law enforcement pressure against terrorist criminals, and active engagement with affected communities to resolve underlying injustices."

I'll just include the article and hope that it initiates some dialogue, hopefully including both criticism and affinity

Nonviolence and the strategy against terrorism

by David Cortright

In the months after 9/11, Jim Wallis challenged peace advocates to address the threat of terrorism. “If nonviolence is to have any credibility,” he wrote, “it must answer the questions violence purports to answer, but in a better way.” Gandhian principles of nonviolence provide a solid foundation for crafting an effective strategy against terrorism. Nonviolence is fundamentally a means of achieving justice and combating oppression. Gandhi demonstrated its effectiveness in resisting racial injustice in South Africa and winning independence for India. People-power movements have since spread throughout the world, helping to bring down communism in Eastern Europe and advancing democracy in Serbia, Ukraine, and beyond. The same principles - fighting injustice while avoiding harm - can be applied in the struggle against violent extremism.
Bush administration officials and many political leaders in Washington view terrorism primarily through the prism of war. Kill enough militants, they believe, and the threat will go away. The opposite approach is more effective and less costly in lives. Some limited use of force to apprehend militants and destroy training camps is legitimate, but unilateral war is not. In the three years since the invasion of Iraq, the number of major terrorist incidents in the world has increased sharply. War itself is a form of terrorism. Using military force to counter terrorism is like pouring gasoline on a fire. It ignites hatred and vengeance and creates a cycle of violence that can spin out of control. A better strategy is to take away the fuel that sustains the fire. Only nonviolent methods can do that, by attempting to resolve the underlying political and social factors that give rise to armed violence.
The most urgent priority for countering terrorism, experts agree, is multilateral law enforcement to apprehend perpetrators and prevent future attacks. Cooperative law enforcement and intelligence sharing among governments have proven effective in reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks. Governments are also cooperating to block financing for terrorist networks and deny safe haven, travel, and arms for terrorist militants. These efforts are fully compatible with the principles of nonviolence.
Terrorism is fundamentally a political phenomenon, concluded the U.N. Working Group on Terrorism in 2002. To overcome the scourge, “it is necessary to understand its political nature as well as its basic criminality and psychology.” This means addressing legitimate political grievances that terrorist groups exploit - such as the Israel-Palestine dispute, repressive policies by Arab governments, and the continuing U.S. military occupation in Iraq. These deeply-held grievances generate widespread political frustration and bitterness in many Arab and Muslim countries, including among people who condemn terrorism and al Qaeda’s brutal methods. As these conditions fester and worsen, support rises for the groups that resist them. Finding solutions to these dilemmas can help to undercut support for jihadism. The strategy against terrorism requires undermining the social base of extremism by driving a wedge between militants and their potential sympathizers. The goal should be to separate militants from their support base by resolving the political injustices that terrorists exploit.
A nonviolent approach should not be confused with appeasement or a defeatist justification of terrorist crimes. The point is not to excuse criminal acts but to learn why they occur and use this knowledge to prevent future attacks. A nonviolent strategy seeks to reduce the appeal of militants’ extremist methods by addressing legitimate grievances and providing channels of political engagement for those who sympathize with the declared political aims. A two-step response is essential: determined law enforcement pressure against terrorist criminals, and active engagement with affected communities to resolve underlying injustices. Ethicist Michael Walzer wrote, counterterrorism “must be aimed systematically at the terrorists themselves, never at the people for whom the terrorists claim to be acting.” Military attacks against potential sympathizers are counterproductive and tend to drive third parties toward militancy. Lawful police action is by its nature more discriminating and is more effective politically because it minimizes predictable backlash effects.
Gandhi’s political genius was in understanding the power of third party opinion. He did not try to challenge the British militarily but instead organized mass resistance to weaken the political legitimacy of the Raj. The nonviolent method, Reinhold Niebuhr wrote, undermines the authority and “moral unction” of the adversary. Gandhi realized that political struggles are ultimately a battle for hearts and minds. In all his campaigns, he assiduously cultivated the support of third parties by avoiding harm to the innocent and addressing legitimate grievances. These are essential insights for the struggle against terrorism. The fight will not be won on the battlefield. The more it is waged on that front, the less likely it can be won. The goal of U.S. strategy, said the 9/11 Commission, must be “prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamic terrorism.” Nonviolent resistance is the opposite of and a necessary antidote to the ideology of extreme violence. Gandhi often said, “An eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind.” Better to keep our eyes open as we search for more effective means of eroding support for extremism, while protecting the innocent and bringing violent perpetrators to justice.

David Cortright is the author of Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for an Age of Terrorism (Paradigm Publishers, 2006) and co-founder of the Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation.

2006-08-11T00:27:00.000-04:00

Evan tagged me because he is an inclusivist.
1. One book that changed your life: Jayber Crow by Wendell Berry
2. One book that you’ve read more than once: Jurassic Park
3. One book you’d want on a desert island: Home Economics by Wendell Berry
4. One book that made you laugh: Everybody Poops
5. One book that made you cry: The Holy Bible
6. One book your glad has been written: Any Wendell Berry book
7. One book you wish had never been written: Wild at Heart or The Prayer of Jabez
8. One book you’re currently reading: The Human Condition by Hannah Arendt
9. One book you’ve been meaning to read: Kant's Critique of Judgment

Paste's 100 Best Living Songwriters

2006-07-13T17:43:00.000-04:00

Best Lists. Good catalysts for controversy. So without further adieu, I set before your anxious, sparkling eyes...

Paste's 100 Best Living Songwriters
1. Bob Dylan
2. Neil Young
3. Bruce Springsteen
4. Waits/Brennan
5. Paul McCartney
6. Leonard Cohen
7. Brian Wilson
8. Elvis Costello
9. Joni Mitchell
10. Prince
11. Randy Newman
12. Jagger/Richards
13. Paul Simon
14. Stevie Wonder
15. Willie Nelson
16. David Bowie
17. Holland/Dozier/Holland
18. U2
19. Patty Griffin
20. Van Morrison
21. Lou Reed
22. Lucinda Williams
23. John/Taupin
24. Jeff Tweedy
25. Chuck Berry
26. R.E.M.
27. Radiohead
28. Robbie Robertson
29. Tom Petty
30. John Prine
31. Carole King
32. Leiber/Stoller
33. Pete Townshend
34. John Fogerty
35. Steve Earle
36. Beck
37. Smokey Robinson
38. Kris Kristofferson
39. Led Zeppelin
40. Bacharach/David
41. Ray Davies
42. Loretta Lynn
43. Ryan Adams
44. Al Green
45. Jackson Browne
46. David Byrne
47. Sufjan Stevens
48. Welch/Rawlings
49. Cat Stevens
50. Public Enemy
51. Penn/Oldham
52. Paul Westerberg
53. James Taylor
54. Aimee Mann
55. Dolly Parton
56. James Brown
57. Morrissey
58. Sly Stone
59. Jack White
60. Jimmy Webb
61. John Hiatt
62. Sting
63. Richard Thompson
64. Andy Partridge
65. Bill Mallonee
66. Charles Thompson
67. Conor Oberst
68. Allen Toussaint
69. Merle Haggard
70. Alex Chilton
71. Vic Chesnutt
72. Michael Jackson
73. Julie Miller
74. Over the Rhine
75. Ron Sexsmith
76. Will Oldham
77. Bruce Cockburn
78. Robert Pollard
79. Stephen Malkmus
80. Pink Floyd
81. The Flaming Lips
82. John Darnielle
83. Fleetwood Mac
84. They Might Be Giants
85. David Bazan
86. Sam Beam
87. Lyle Lovett
88. Parliament
89. Victoria Williams
90. Nick Cave
91. Drive-By Truckers
92. Alejandro Escovedo
93. Joseph Arthur
94. Sam Phillips
95. Patti Smith
96. Jimmy Cliff
97. Josh Ritter
98. Jay Farrar
99. Outkast
100. T. Bone Burnett

I like the list. I'm glad to see Tom Waits checking in at #4 and David Bazan making the cut. However, I don't fully agree with the order, or the inclusion of some songwriters, even some that I like, that resulted in the exclusion of others. To begin, why are John/Taupin at #23 while Patty Griffin is at #19? Why was Ryan Adams (#43) included in the list? Sure, his songs are ok, but a top 100 Songwriter? Above James Taylor (#53) and Cat Stevens (#49)?!?! Why are The Flaming Lips(#81) above Fleetwood Mac (#83), let alone even on this list? Why is Rivers Cuomo not on the list? I agree he hasn't really written a good song since Pinkerton, but it's not like Bono writes good songs anymore either (and U2 still made #18).

What do you think?

Artistic Proof Debunks Shroud of Turin

2006-07-09T22:42:00.000-04:00

This week on the History Channel's series Decoding the Past, there has been much inquiry into the enigmatic "Bible Mysteries"; such as the hoaky Bible Code, and the authenticity of the Shroud of Turin (a portion of which is pictured above). Particularly concerning the shroud, there have arisen many theories that have been supported or debunked by scientific "proof", such as carbon dating and the testing of radiation levels. This seems to be modern Scientism run rampant. From wherest comes the uber-romantic worship of the scientific method? Isn't this the absolutization of one aspect of existence? In this post, I wish to objectively debunk the Shroud of Turin from an artistic aspect.
Apparently, these scientists testing whether this shroud is actually the burial clothes of Jesus of Nazareth have never heard the old Robert Lowry hymn “Nothing But the Blood of Jesus” (1876). According to the refrain of this sacred hymn, “Oh! precious is the flow/That makes me white as snow/No other fount I know/Nothing but the blood of Jesus.” If the blood of Jesus has the power to make me “white as snow”, I’m sure the blood of Jesus has the power to keep whites whiter. Note the blood around the forehead of the image from the supposed “crown of thorns”, shouldn’t this be enough hemo-fluid (what we non-scientists call “blood”) to cleanse at least this shroud “white as snow”. However, this shroud is rather filthy and I’m sure Mary didn’t raise Jesus to leave his dirty whites lying around.

Culture and Globalization Reconsidered [Part 4]

2006-05-23T21:25:00.000-04:00

Applying the thought of Arendt and Adorno to contemporary research on culture and globalization has substantial implications. The three theses concerning globalization and culture, outlined above, no longer appear to be focusing on culture per se, but instead on consumer goods; the commodities of the culture industry.
The polarization thesis seems to be strengthened. Through the lenses of Arendt and Adorno, it appears that the polarization thesis is referring to the polarization of, on the one hand, global consumer capitalism and the commodification of cultural objects and, on the other, cultural fundamentalism (and tribalism) and those who wish to distance themselves from the commodification of the culture industry. This is not to say that these cultures are actually polarized, but that there is a division between those who are assimilated into the global capitalist economy and those who wish to remain distinct from the global economy despite its power moves.
The homogenization thesis seems to be strengthened, but also transformed. Cultures are being homogenized (even as they are being hybridized), but not necessarily in the sense of Americanization, Westernization, or peripheral cultures becoming a cultural monolith similar to the core. Cultures are becoming homogenized in that the cultural objects are becoming commodities in the global market; homogenization as commodification. More and more cultures are being assimilated and homogenized into the global economy and their cultural objects are becoming commodities. Furthermore, the commodities of the culture industry appear to be fulfilling the desires of local consumers, however the culture industry standarizes and manipulates these desires and, in the end, the consumer desires the commodities produced by the culture industry. Critics of the homogenization thesis can speak of glocalization, the adaption of global products to satiate local tastes, but this is not simply a neutral hybridization of culture, but an adaption of global products to satiate local tastes in order to make a profit on the commodities of the culture industry.
The hybridization thesis seems to be unmasked of the guise of cultural diversity and is seen in a different light; as a hybridization of commodities to be consumed by consumers in other global regions in order to turn a profit. Granted, cultures are experiencing a hybridization, however, the cultural objects of a culture are (being) transformed into commodities to be consumed in the global market. Vietnamese restaurants in Toronto offer a commodity to be consumed by consumers to make a profit in the global market. McDonald’s in Moscow is offering a commodity to be consumed, not a culture to endure. A cultural object in one region of the world is turned into a commodity that can turn a profit in another region of the world. Whether the people of this other region want the commodity or not, the cultural industry manipulates the desires of these consumers to desire these commodities. Therefore, the hybridization thesis is not referring to the hybridization of cultures, but to the recent availability of one region’s consumer goods (such as McDonald’s) in other regions of the world (such as Moscow), or the hybridization of consumer cultures.
As cultural objects are assimilated into the despotism of the global capitalist economy, the cultural objects become commodified and standardized. Cultural objects have been turned into commodities, and in so doing, commodities have been given the same status of the displaced cultural objects; commodities are now considered “culture”, as can be seen in Holton and Nederveen Pieterse’s descriptions of culture. Here is where we see such things as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola referred to as “culture”. It is not that McDonald’s and Coca-Cola have been elevated to the status of culture, but culture has become commodities and commodities have been given the title of “culture” because of their identical status and ends in the capitalist economy; as commodities or objects with exchange value to be consumed.
Must we think of culture as a commodity to be consumed? Can we think of culture otherwise? As something that cultivates nature into a place fit for human habitation? And as something that endures and outlasts?

The Commodification of Culture: Arendt and Adorno [Part 3]

2006-05-23T21:24:00.000-04:00

In discussing these three paradigms of culture within an increasingly globalized world, the utilized concepts of culture emerge as all-inclusive descriptions as to what is included under the umbrella of “culture”. Nederveen Pieterse, in Globalization and Culture, relies on a common anthropological definition articulated as follows, “culture refers to behavior and beliefs that are learned and shared: learned so it is not ‘instinctual’ and shared so it is not individual.”[1] Likewise, Holton employs Clifford Geertz’s description of culture as a catalyst to commence his article. Geertz describes the concept of culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbolic forms by means of which men [sic] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”[2] Within this definition, writes Holton, “[t]here is room here for Coca-Cola as much as Chopin, for practical knowledge as much as religious symbolism.”[3] Granted, culture, when described in the ways above, does indeed envelope Coca-Cola and Chopin, McDonald’s and Michelangelo, ATM’s and Ambrose Bierce. However, does culture lose its meaning when described in such an all-inclusive way? Can descriptions of culture have any meaning if both the Big Mac and the sculpture of Bacchus are considered cultural artifacts? In what follows, the thought of Hannah Arendt and Theodor Adorno will be employed both to critique the contemporary “mass culture” (Arendt) or “culture industry (Adorno) and lead toward a more specific and nuanced description of culture within an increasingly globalized world.
Hannah Arendt, in her essay “The Crisis in Culture”[4], refers to the anxiety concerning the relationship between (mass) society and (mass) culture, and to the strange situation of the modern individual characterized by loneliness, excitability, and lack of judgment. She questions whether it is still possible to rediscover the past without continuing standards of interpretation, in an increasingly secularized world of utilitarian culture. This survey will focus on Arendt’s analysis of what she identifies as the contemporary “mass culture” and, later in the essay, rearticulates as “mass entertainment”.
In her essay, Arendt begins with an etymological account of culture.
Culture, word and concept is Roman in origin. The word ‘culture’ derives from colere – to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, to tend and preserve – and it relates primarily to the intercourse of man [sic] with nature in the sense of cultivating and tending nature until it becomes fit for human habitation. As such, it indicates an attitude of loving care and stands in sharp contrast to all efforts to subject nature to the domination of man [sic].[5]

However, this is only one side of Arendt’s concept of culture. She continues by revealing the cultural characteristic of durability. “An object is cultural to the extent that it can endure; its durability is the very opposite of functionality, which is the quality which makes it disappear again from the phenomenal world by being used and used up.”[6] Therefore, for Arendt, “developing nature into a dwelling place for a people as well as in the sense of taking care of the monuments of the past, determine even today the content and the meaning we have in mind when we speak of culture.”[7]
In her essay, Arendt describes the concept of “philistinism” as a notion which “designated a mentality which judged everything in terms of immediate usefulness and ‘material values’ and hence had no regard for such useless objects and occupations as are implied in culture and art.”[8] At the turn of the 18th century, society could be described in terms of “philistinism”, as lacking interest in culture and art due to culture and arts lack of a relevant, utilitarian aspect. However, the philistine was displaced by the cultural philistine who “seized upon [cultural artifacts] as a currency by which he [sic] bought a higher position in society or acquired a higher degree of self-esteem.”[9] The cultural philistine ascribed value to cultural objects. These ascribed values, according to Arendt, “were what values always have been, exchange values”.[10] Society, then for Arendt, “wanted culture, evaluated and devaluated cultural things into social commodities, used and abused them for its own selfish purposes, but did not ‘consume’ them.”[11] Society is distinguished from mass society in the sense that mass society “wants not culture but entertainment, and the wares offered by the entertainment industry are indeed consumed by society just like any other consumer goods.”[12] Culture objects have become commodities of the entertainment industry and are, therefore, no longer “cultural objects whose excellence is measured by their ability to withstand the life process and become permanent appurtenances of the world”.[13] For Arendt, they should not be judged according to these standards. Furthermore, they are not “values which exist to be used and exchanged”.[14] According to Arendt, the commodities of the entertainment industry “are consumer goods, destined to be used up, just like any other consumer goods.”[15] Cultural objects are preyed upon my mass society, and mass society “will literally consume the cultural objects, eat them up and destroy them”.[16] No longer considered cultural objects, these consumer goods
serve…to while away time, and the vacant time which is whiled away is not leisure time, strictly speaking – time, that is, in which we are free from all cares and activities necessitated by the life process and therefore free for the world and its culture – it is rather left-over time which still is biological in nature, left over after labor and sleep have received their due. [17]

Therefore, for Arendt, “culture is being destroyed in order to yield entertainment”[18] and this consumer’s society, in search for entertainment is “feeding on the cultural objects of the world.”[19]
Theodor Adorno, in “Culture Industry Reconsidered”[20], explains that “mass culture” is not an adequate descriptor and instead propones the term “culture industry”. Adorno believes the culture industry is a system by which society is controlled though a top-down creation of standardized culture that intensifies the commodification of artistic expression. Like Arendt, Adorno writes of the commodification of cultural objects. “The cultural commodities of the industry are governed…by the principle of their realization as value, and not by their own specific content and harmonious formation.” Adorno continues, “[t]he entire practice of the culture industry transfers the profit motive naked onto cultural forms.”[21] He qualifies this statement by writing, “[e]ver since these cultural forms first began to earn a living for their creators as commodities in the market-place they had already possessed something of this quality.”[22] However, the economic aspect has been privileged and this commodification has intensified in our contemporary context, so much so that the “[c]ultural entities typical of the culture industry are no longer also commodities, they are commodities through and through.”[23] Culture has become an industry that submits to the rules of any other producer of commodities. Culture has been forced into a pastiche dominated by the capitalist economy.
In works such as Dialectic of Enlightenment (with Max Horkheimer) and Negative Dialectics, Adorno theorizes that the phenomenon of mass culture has a political implication, namely that all the many forms of popular culture have become a single culture industry whose purpose is to ensure the continued obedience of the masses to market interests. Although Western culture was previously divided first into national markets and then into highbrow, middlebrow and lowbrow, the contemporary view of the culture industry is that there is a single marketplace in which the best or most popular works succeed. This recognizes that the consolidation of media companies has centralized power in the hands of the few remaining multinational corporations now controlling production and distribution. The theory proposes that culture not only mirrors society, but also takes an important role in shaping society through the processes of standardization and commodification, creating objects rather than subjects. The culture industry claims to serve the consumers’ needs for entertainment, but conceals the way that it standardizes these needs, manipulating the consumers to desire what it produces. The outcome is that mass production feeds a mass market where the identity and tastes of the individual consumers is increasingly less important and the consumers themselves are as interchangeable as the products they consume.
Arendt’s critique of mass culture, or mass entertainment, and Adorno’s critique of the culture industry both problematize the descriptions of culture posited by Holton and Nederveen Pieterse. If “culture” is characterized by its durability, and mass culture or the culture industry refers to the commodification of cultural objects that leads to the consumption of these cultural objects, then these cultural objects can no longer endure and outlast. Therefore, if these cultural objects are consumed, they are no longer “culture” according to Arendt’s description.
[1] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 46.
[2] Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System”, The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, 1973, 89, quoted in Holton’s “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 142.
[3] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 142.
[4] Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Its Political Significance”, Between Past and Future, Penguin Books, 1993, 197-226.
[5] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 211-212.
[6] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 209.
[7] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 213.
[8] Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture”, 201.
[9] Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture”, 204.
[10] Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture”, 204.
[11] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 205.
[12] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 205.
[13] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 205.
[14] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 205.
[15] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 205-206.
[16] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 207.
[17] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 205. Arendt’s emphasis.
[18] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 207.
[19] Arendt, “The Crisis of Culture”, 211.
[20] Theodor Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered”, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, J.M. Bernstein, ed., Routledge, 1991, 85-92.
[21] Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered”, 86.
[22] Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered”, 86.
[23] Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered”, 86. Adorno’s emphasis.

Culture and Globalization: Polarization, Homogenization, Hybridization [Part 2]

2006-05-23T21:22:00.000-04:00

In recent cultural studies, the foremost inquiry concerns the influence globalization has upon culture. In what follows, the three major paradigms that have surfaced in contemporary scholarship will be surveyed. This section will rely heavily on the thought of Jan Nederveen Pieterse, as presented in his book Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange, and Robert Holton’s article, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”. This section will begin with a survey of the polarization thesis, followed by an overview of the homogenization thesis, and concluding with an outline of the hybridization thesis.

The Polarization Thesis: The Clash of Civilizations
Benjamin Barber argues that cultural forces in the shadow of globalization are experiencing a global cultural polarization and characterizes this cultural phenomenon (and entitled his 1995 monograph) as Jihad vs. McWorld.[1] These dialectical metaphors refer to the cultural polarization of global consumer capitalism, metonymically embodied in McDonald’s, and Jihad, referring to cultural fundamentalism (and tribalism) and the struggle for justice for the downtrodden left maimed in the path of global capitalism. McWorld, then, promises to bind us together through consumption of so-called “cultural” commodities, while Jihad promises liberation from the capitalistic characteristic of consumption and greed through tribal pursuit of justice.
Samuel Huntington, the president of the Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, is another advocate of the polarization thesis. He writes that “a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in coming years…will be the clash of civilizations…. With the end of the Cold War, international politics move out of its Western phase, and its centerpiece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations.”[2] Huntington divides the world into “the West and the Rest”. He writes that the “political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War” (i.e. between the USA and USSR) have been replaced by the boundaries of civilizations (i.e. between the West and Islam) and these boundaries between civilizations are “the flash points for crisis and bloodshed”.[3] Huntington considers the West as a “universal civilization” and the “rest” are attempting a “modernization without westernization” and moreover, these “differing modernities” lead to the “breakdown of western civilizational hegemony”.[4] However, according to Nederveen Pieterse, the West has strong ties in “the rest” through arms flows and military technologies trading. In a post-Cold War world, and the United State’s role within it, is less a civilizational conflict and more an “unraveling of geopolitical security games most of which have been initiated by the U.S. in the first place…”.[5] However, as Nederveen Pieterse writes, “[t]he oddity of Huntington’s view” is its “political perspective on culture coined in conventional national security language. Culture is politicized, wrapped in civilizational packages that just happen to coincide with geopolitical entities.”[6] Huntington’s view of cultural conflict emphasizes that which distinguishes one people from another. This is a very specific description of culture, according to Nederveen Pieterse, and furthermore, is a one sided notion of culture. “Diversity is one side of the picture but only one, and interaction, commonality or the possibility of commonality is another.”[7] Nederveen Pieterse goes on to give a common, anthropological definition of culture; “culture refers to behavior and beliefs that are learned and shared: learned so it is not ‘instinctual’ and shared so it is not individual.”[8] This places no boundaries on culture; “and therefore, culture is always open.”[9] Cultural relativism or “cultural differentialism” can serve as a defense for cultural diversity and lead to local empowerment, but it could also lead to a “politics of nostalgia”.[10] However, Nederveen Pieterse writes that “[e]ither way the fallacy is the reification of the local, sidelining the interplay between the local and the global.”[11] Mainly, Nederveen Pieterse believes that Huntington fails to mention the cultural connection between the East and the West and also the cultural difference within the West; between North America and Europe.

The Homogenization Thesis: The McDonaldization of Culture
In the dark shadow of globalization, the most widely held description of culture is that of homogenization; the “convergence toward a common set of cultural traits and practices.”[12] Those who consider culture to be continually directed toward homogenization, hold the belief that the so-called global culture follows the global economy and this has lead to such phrases as “Coca-colonization” and “McDonaldization”. The notion of “McDonaldization” refers to the “worldwide homogenization of societies through the impact of multinational corporations.”[13] McDonaldization is viewed as cultural Westernization, and more particularly Americanization, of the entire globe.
In this view, the mechanisms for change are closely linked with the globalization of the market economy and multinational corporations. As Robert Holton notes, “[c]onsumer capitalism of this type has been built upon a standardized brand image, mass advertising, and the high status given by many Third World populations to Western products and services.”[14] The birth of the global consumer has not simply been founded upon “the utilitarian convenience of global products” but “on the sale of dreams of affluence, personal success, and erotic gratification evoked through advertising and culture industry of Hollywood.”[15]
Furthermore, this view of cultural homogenization and the global economy has been strengthened by the rise of the Internet and other information technologies. Companies such as Yahoo!, Microsoft, Google, and Motorola have perhaps surpassed McDonalds and Coca-Cola as cultural icons at least among the world’s affluent populations. This reveals that, if there is any warrant to the homogenization thesis, it is not a static homogenization.
Another dimension of cultural homogenization is that of the assimilation of “elites” into the political, educational, and economic life of Western society. The experience of a Western education not only globally disseminates Western knowledge but also creates similar values which then influence international organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and multinational/global corporations. This gives rise to the emergence of similar interests of global “elites”.[16]
There is much to be said of the homogenization thesis provided that it is viewed in a dynamic and ever-changing way. However, viewing the interrelationship of globalization and culture as ever-evolving toward a monolithic global culture has its limitations and is open to critique. First, as Holton notes, “the strong association of cultural globalization with Americanization is overstated.”[17] In this post-colonial age, there remains a strong cultural relationship between the former colonizing nations (for example; the United Kingdom and France) and their former colonies (such as India and the former French Congo). Evidence of this includes the predominance of cricket over baseball in India, or the Coca-Cola consumed in the former French Congo, which is bottled in Europe where the French-speaking Congolese look for cultural status.[18] “Paris is the cultural magnet”, writes Holton, “not New York or California.”[19]
A second critique against the homogenization thesis is leveled by Shannon Peters Talbott in her examination of the homogenization thesis, and particularly McDonaldization, through ethnography of McDonald’s in Moscow. She concludes that it is not so much cultural homogenization, but a global localization. The Moscow McDonald’s varies from its American, Western counterparts by catering to the consumers in Moscow.[20] As Nederveen Pieterse writes, “Firms may be multinational but ‘all business is local’.”[21] McDonald’s then may be an increasing global corporation; it only survives by catering to local tastes and needs. Therefore, for Nederveen Pieterse, “it would make more sense to consider McDonaldization as a form of intercultural hybridization, partly in its origins and certainly in its present globally localizing variety of forms.”[22] Multinational corporations, such as McDonald’s have abandoned product standardization and have developed marketing, design, and product strategies that are as numerous as the variations of consumer demands in differing markets. This is “glocalization”, a notion that “has been used to suggest that the global and the local may be mutually reinforcing rather than necessarily in conflict.”[23] Markets, customers, and products may be global in many contexts, but are local in design and content.
The above critiques are focused on the homogenization thesis in general and Americanization in particular, this third and final critique is centered specifically on cultural homogenization as Westernization. In his essay “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy”, Arjun Appadurai writes of regional homogenization, where the cultural “periphery” is threatened by cultural homogenization from the cultural “core”. He writes, “for the people of Irian Jaya, Indonesianization may be more worrisome than Americanization, as Japanization may be for the Koreans, Indianization for Sri Lankans, Vietnamization for Cambodians”.[24] There are then, according to Appadurai’s analysis, multiple “cores” that hold cultural power, rather than a relationship of core-periphery centered on the United States or the West, to which all others are homogenized.
Cultural homogenization, if there is such a thing, is not as simple as some would take it to be. First, if it is to be considered at all, it is imperative that it is viewed as a dynamic process. Second, there is much evidence that if cultural homogenization is occurring, it is not simply an Americanization of the cultural world. In the second critique above, we see that other Western cultures have arisen as cultural powers from the remains of colonialism. However, this is still focused, perhaps too greatly, on the Western world as containing the cultural powers that are shaping the rest of the world. Therefore, third, if the world is experiencing cultural homogenization, we must view this homogenization as being a multi-centered phenomenon, a homogenization of peripheral cultures to “core” regional cultural powers.

The Hybridization Thesis:
The third and final paradigm to be surveyed views the interconnection between globalization and culture as a hybridization of cultures in the world. Holton writes that the hybridization thesis focuses “on the intercultural exchange and the incorporation of cultural elements from a variety of sources within particular cultural practices.”[25] There is an over-abundance of evidence strengthening this thesis. For example, the McDonald’s in Moscow that mixes an American fast-food restaurant into a Russian market. Or the use of ATM’s in Japan used by women in kimonos. Or the young American students who eat at a Vietnamese restaurant after class in Toronto. Hybridization is not only urban, for example, agricultural techniques (such as plowing techniques and crop rotation). The evidence that strengthens the hybridization is difficult to exhaust.
For Nederveen Pieterse, hybridization is the “solvent between the polar perspectives”, it derives its “existence” from the paradigm of polarization and the paradigm of homogenization, and derives meaning only in relation to them.[26] “It resolves the tension between purity and emanation, between the local and the global, in the dialectic according to which the local is in the global and the global is in the local.”[27] Hybridization, according to Nederveen Pieterse, views globalization as an open-ended process of interconnection of cultural influences (eastern as well as western). “The growing awareness of cultural difference” and globalization are interdependent.[28] There is both cultural difference and a “striving for recognition” on the global scale. This “striving for recognition” for Nederveen Pieterse, “implies a claim to equality, equal rights, same treatment: in other words a common universe of difference”.[29]
Furthermore, Holton writes that hybridization refers to “cultural forms that are somehow transcontextual but less than cosmopolitan in scope.”[30] In this sense, we can still speak of different “cultures”, as they are not cosmopolitan culture, but we must recognize that they are some of the cultural forms are transcontextual, therefore “cultures have become so intermixed that there is no longer any pure or authentic culture distinct from others.”[31] For Nederveen Pieterse, hybridization privileges border crossing and begins in the “fuzziness of boundaries” and therefore subverts both nationalism and identity politics.[32] The importance of the hybridization of cultures, for Nederveen Pieterse, “is that it problematizes boundaries.”[33]
[1] Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, Ballantine Books, 1995.
[2] Quoted in Nederveen Pieterse’s Globalization and Culture, 42-43.
[3] Quoted in Nederveen Pieterse’s Globalization and Culture, 44.
[4] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 44.
[5] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 44-45.
[6] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 45.
[7] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 46.
[8] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 46.
[9] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 46.
[10] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 47.
[11] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 47.
[12] Robert Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 570, July 2000, 142.
[13] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 49.
[14] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 142.
[15] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 142.
[16] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 143.
[17] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 143.
[18] Jonathon Friedman, Cultural Identity and Global Process, Sage, 1994.
[19] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 143.
[20] Shannon Peters Talbott, “Analysis of Corporate Culture in the Global Market-place: Case Study of McDonald’s in Moscow”, Paper Presented at International Institute of Sociology Conference, Trieste, 1995 cited in Nederveen Pieterse’s Globalization and Culture, 50.
[21] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 50.
[22] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 51.
[23] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 144.
[24] Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy”, Global Culture, M. Featherstone, ed., Sage, 1990, 170.
[25] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 148.
[26] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 57.
[27] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 57.
[28] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 57.
[29] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 58.
[30] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 150.
[31] Holton, “Globalization’s Cultural Consequences”, 150.
[32] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 53.
[33] Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture, 86.

Culture and Commodity: Globalization and the Culture Industry [Part 1]

2006-05-23T21:20:00.000-04:00

In a shrinking world, where space and place have been dominated by time (identified by Heidegger as “uniform distancelessness”[1]), where national differences are being superceded by “gender and identity politics, ethnic and religious movements, minority rights, and indigenous people”[2] , how should one engage cultural differences? In an increasingly borderless, globalized world, are cultures clashing (the polarization thesis), becoming converged and monolithic (the homogenization thesis), or experiencing a cultural global mélange (the hybridization thesis)?
However, before a description of cultural activity can be determined, a normative description of the concept of culture must be offered. This is where the paradigms of hybridization, homogenization, and polarization jump the proverbial gun. With a weak foundation, these theses will deteriorate and begin to crumble. Therefore, using the thought of Hannah Arendt and Theodor Adorno, this paper will offer a critique of the descriptions of culture used as the foundation for these three paradigms; the polarization thesis, the homogenization thesis, and the hybridization thesis. It would seem that these three paradigms begin with a description of culture that ignores Arendt’s critique of “mass culture” and Adorno’s critique of the “culture industry”, and, therefore, these three paradigms, when referring to “culture” are instead referring to the commodities of the culture industry. They are referring to commodities that are consumed, rather than culture that endures, outlasts, and cultivates nature for human habitation.
The trajectory of this paper will begin with a survey of the three accepted paradigms of culture in the face of globalization; the polarization thesis, the homogenization thesis, and the hybridization thesis. In the second section will consist of an overview of Arendt and Adorno’s critique of mass culture (Arendt) or the culture industry (Adorno). This will then be applied to the description of culture employed as the foundation of these three paradigms. Finally, the third section will briefly survey the three paradigms through the lens of Adorno and Arendt’s critique of the culture industry.

[1] Martin Heidegger, “The Thing”, Poetry, Language, Thought, Perennial Classics, 2001, 163-164. “Man puts the longest distances behind him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and this puts everything before him in the shortest range.” Through time, space has been conflated and abolished. Heidegger continues, “What is incalculably far from us in point of distance can be near us…What is happening here when, as a result of the abolition of great distances, everything is equally far and equally near? What is this uniformity in which everything is neither far nor near – is, as it were, without distance? Everything is getting lumped together into uniform distancelessness. How? Is not this merging of everything into the distanceless more unearthly than everything bursting apart?...What is it that unsettles and thus terrifies? It shows itself and hides itself in the way in which everything presences, namely, in the fact that despite all conquest of distances the nearness of things remains absent.”
[2] Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, 41-42.

Must Christianity Be Consumeristic: Satire as Critique/Satire as Sacrilege

2006-03-07T17:20:00.000-05:00

***Disclaimer: This post contains an explicit satirical cartoon that could be offensive to many. ((Viewer Discretion is Advised ))***

Shortly after the violent uproar over the publication of a satirical cartoon portraying Muhammad with a bomb for a turban, the University of Saskatchewan's school newspaper, The Sheaf, published a satirical cartoon of their own (one that they have since issued an apology). In this cartoon, entitled "Capitalist Piglet", a pig dressed as a greedy capitalist bureaucrat and the pig's long haired companion are interrupted mid-fellation by a middle-aged colleague who exclaims "Jesus Christ!" at the at sight of the explicit act of oral sex. In the next frame, however, we find that he did not proclaim the name of our Lord Jesus Christ as a vain expletive, but as a reference to Jesus Christ, the benefactor of the blow-job!
I'm not, in any way, condoning the cartoon. However, I think this cartoon calls us as Christians to take a step back for critical self-appraisal. Have our consumptive habits warranted such a cartoon (a "Don't Let My Car Fool You, My Treasure Is In Heaven" sticker on the bumper of a Hummer)? Is the Church directed by the Holy Spirit to make faithful responses to God's calling, or has the Church made a treaty with the Zeitgeist, the spirit of Mammon, allowing this spirit to direct our economic praxis? How should we respond to this cartoon? Should we confirm its accuracy, by crying "sacrilege", attacking everyone and everything involved without confronting the actual critique (which seems to be a valid one), and continuing our current consumeristic habits? Or should we respond with critical self-appraisal, and, as the body of Christ, respond faithfully to Christ's teaching concerning the poor?

Evangelicals Care About Creation!

2006-02-14T00:44:00.000-05:00

"Nature, the world, has no value, no interest for Christians. The Christian thinks only of himself and the salvation of his soul." - Ludwig Feuerbach
A subversive group of Evangelical leaders (including Brian McLaren, Rick Warren, and Calvin College president Gaylen Byker) have issued a statement on global warming (climate change) entitled "Climate Change: An Evangelical Call to Action". In this statement, the authors posit four claims: 1) "Human-Induced Climate Change is Real", 2) "The Consequences of Climate Change Will Be Significant, and Will Hit the Poor the Hardest", 3) "Christian Moral Convictions Demand Our Response to the Climate Change Problem", and 4) "The need to act now is urgent. Governments, businesses, churches, and individuals all have a role to play in addressing climate change starting now."

I commend them in the issuing of this statement. It is a bold and urgent call to action that is of great need in the evangelical community.

"Any error about creation also leads to an error about God." - Thomas Aquinas

The (Im)Permeability of American Borders: National Security and the Free Market

2006-01-30T00:11:00.000-05:00

Following the events of 9/11, American is suffering from a complicated national schizophrenia. On the one hand, there is the "America Whose Business is Business". This American "personality" is characterized by the opening of American boundaries to international and global markets. American businesses are hastefully searching for cheap labor, tax "shelters", cheap materials, alternative market-places to participate in (and exploit)... Thanks to the free-market our boundaries are open and we are ready for business.
However, on the other hand, we find the "America Whose Business is National Defense". A phrenic personality of America that is hastefully withdrawing from the world. This side of America, now that the evil of the world has "slapped us in the face", is reacting immaturely and dangerously; "threating left and right, repudiating agreements, and angering friends." Thanks to the ever-growing shadow of terrorism our boundaries are closed and we are trembling in fear.
Can we have a permeable economic border and an impermeable geographic border? Is this a practical dialectic (that concerns two different aspects of American boundaries) within which the American national identity takes shape, or is it a contradiction that will eventually lead to a failure in either the market or in national security? Can our isolationist morality and (international/global) market dependence co-exist? Must we "assume a more humble posture in the presence of the global economy"?
"On the one hand, we have the future as a consumer's paradise in which everybody will be able to buy comfort, convenience, and happiness. On the other hand, we have this government's new future in which terrible things are bound to happen if we don't do terrible things in the present - which, of course, will make terrible things even more likely to happen in the future."
How, then, shall we live? But who, we?

(I'm thankful that I am neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Secretary of Commerce.)

In Memoriam: George Orwell

2006-01-21T13:46:00.000-05:00

"Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. ... By 'patriotism' I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. ... Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality."

- George Orwell (June 25, 1903-January 21, 1950)

The Late, Great Planet Jerusalem: A Historical, Canonical Reading of II Peter 3 (Part IV)

2006-01-15T19:29:00.000-05:00

Therefore, beloved, while you are waiting for these things, strive to be found by him at peace, without spot or blemish; and regard the patience of our Lord as salvation. So also our beloved brother Paul wrote to you according to the wisdom given him, speaking of this as he does in all his letters. There are some things in them hard to understand, which the ignorant and unstable twist to their own destruction, as they do the other scriptures. You therefore, beloved, since you are forewarned, beware that you are not carried away with the error of the lawless and lose your own stability. But grow in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. To him be the glory both now and to the day of eternity. Amen. (II Peter 3:14-18)
Throughout this study, multiple arguments have been made with little or no indication of synthesis; perhaps they even seemed to lack similarity. Presently, I will attempt to show how, I believe, these seemingly arbitrary arguments correspond and can be synthesized.
To begin, as posited above, II Peter 3 is referring to the imminent judgment on Jerusalem and the Temple. Jerusalem, as argued, is viewed as a microcosm “representing the whole creation in its hostility toward God”[1] and the Temple “[represents] the very structure of Creation”[2]. Therefore, the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple “is portrayed as a judgment that is passed on the entire Old World Order.”[3] This coming judgment is not referring to a still future eschatological event, but the fall of Jerusalem that occurred in 70 A.D..
However, to identify this historical event as simply “judgment” somewhat misses the point. II Peter 3 is not simply a passage concerning judgment, but also parousia; the divine presence of God. Therefore, the use of the word “fire”, I argued, has a binary metaphorical meaning; referring both to God’s judgment and God’s divine presence. Furthermore, God does not become present exclusively or primarily to destroy Jerusalem and the Old World Order. As argued, Peter is also applying a binary meaning to λύω; representing both destroying and freeing. Therefore, God’s judgment on Jerusalem is a deliverance of the “New Jerusalem”. As Ansell writes, “The death-throes of the Old World Order marked the birth-pangs of the New Creation.”[4] Following the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple, the “new heavens and a new earth” is established. Similar to the prophecy in Isaiah of the destruction of Jerusalem in 587-586 B.C.E. and the subsequent establishment of “the new heavens and the new earth”, Peter is prophesying the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. and the subsequent genesis of the “new heavens and a new earth”; the new creation within which we know live.
[1] Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, 415.
[2] Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, 413.
[3] Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, 415.
[4] Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, 416.

The Late, Great Planet Jerusalem: A Historical, Canonical Reading of II Peter 3 (Part III)

2006-01-14T21:53:00.000-05:00

Since all these things are to be dissolved in this way, what sort of persons ought you to be in leading lives of holiness and godliness, waiting for and hastening the coming of the day of God, because of which the heavens will be set ablaze and dissolved, and the elements will melt with fire? But, in accordance with his promise, we wait for new heavens and a new earth, where righteousness is at home. (II Peter 3:11-13)
Again, in this passage, λύω is translated “dissolved”, however, this can again be read as “loosed”. This has implications later in verse 11, where Peter asks, “what sort of persons ought you to be…waiting for and hastening the coming (parousia) of the day of God…” In this passage, “hastening” is translated from the Greek σεύδω (speudo) which means “to speed”. σεύδω comes from πούς (pous) which means “foot” or “footstool”. This could be seen as alluding to I Corinthians 15:22-28, Psalms 110, and Psalms 8:6 which refer to placing all things under Christ’s feet. The reader’s of II Peter, the Church, the Body of Christ, are to hasten the parousia of the Lord, by putting all things under Christ’s feet. The reader’s of II Peter would have understood that Christ is sitting at the right hand of God as articulated in Mark 16:19, “After the Lord Jesus had spoken to them, he was taken up into heaven and he sat at the right hand of God.” However, they would have also understood that the Church is the Body of Christ. Colossians 1:17-18 reads, “He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together. He is the head of the body, the church…” Likewise, in Ephesians 1:22-23, Paul writes, “And he has put all things under his feet and has made him the head over all things for the church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all.” As Ansell writes, “Paul, in describing Christ as ‘head’ of the body in Ephesians 1:22 (and Colossians 1:18), echoes the idea of Nebuchadnezzar as the head of gold in Daniel 2:38 whose rule is to be continued by others.”[1] The Church is to both embody and continue, or “flesh out”[2] what Christ began. The Church, therefore, is to place everything under Christ’s feet. The readers of II Peter are to “hasten” the parousia; the parousia of which Peter is referring to commenced at the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 70 A.D.[3]
In verse 13, Peter uses the phrase “new heavens and a new earth”, an obvious allusion to Isaiah 65:17 and 66:22 but the connection of II Peter 3 and the passages in Isaiah is not so obvious from our contemporary perspective. Again we must return to a study on Isaiah to understand the meaning Peter is attempting to convey. As argued above, when Isaiah is discussing the “earth”, he is referring to the Jerusalem which is viewed by his contemporary audience “as a microcosm of the whole world”[4]. Also, as posited above, Isaiah does not redirect his focus from the imminent destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple of which he prophesizes to some still future, eschatological event. This also applies to when Isaiah discusses the “the new heavens and the new earth” in 65:17 and 66:22. Here, in Isaiah, “the new heavens and the new earth” is referring to the return of the scattered inhabitants of 24:1 from exile in Babylon to Jerusalem, and the subsequent reconstruction of a “New Jerusalem”. As Brueggemann writes, “It is Jerusalem that is imagined healed, restored, ransomed, forgiven (65:18-19).”[5] This “healed, restored, ransomed, forgiven” Jerusalem has again degraded and is the “present heavens and earth” found in II Peter 3:7.
Returning to II Peter 3, Peter writes of “new heavens and a new earth” which is connected to “the new heavens and the new earth” of Isaiah 65:17 and 66:22, not in referring to the same future event, but simply as an allusion to a similar historical and canonical event. Isaiah is referring to the reconstruction of Jerusalem and the Temple[6] following their destruction at the hands of the Babylonians in 587-586 B.C.E., and Peter is referring to the construction of the “New Jerusalem” (Revelation 21:2) and a New World Order following the destruction of Jerusalem at the hands of the Roman Empire in 70 A.D. and the end of the Old World Order.
[1] Nicholas John Ansell, “Commentary: Genesis 1:27f, Daniel 2:35 and Ephesians 1:22f”, Third Way, Vol. 25/1, February 2002, 24.
[2] Ansell, “Commentary: Genesis 1:27f, Daniel 2:35 and Ephesians 1:22f”,24. “ In Ephesians 1, the fullness of the divine presence that is concentrated in Christ is extended to (and through) his followers, who embody and further ‘flesh out’ this messianic reality. This is what that all too familiar phrase ‘the body of Christ’ means.”
[3] The Church today, however, is still called to “embody and further ‘flesh out’” the Body of Christ, placing all things under Christ’s feet until God is “all in all”. I Corinthians 15:28 reads, “When all things are subjected to him, then the Son himself will also be subjected to the one who put all things in subjection under him, so that God may be all in all.” When the Church has put everything under Christ’s feet, the Kingdom will be fully realized and God will be “all in all”; “all the earth shall be filled with the glory of Jehovah" (Numbers 14:21).
[4] Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, 413.
[5] Brueggemann, Isaiah 1-39, 2 and Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, 2. Emphasis Brueggemann’s.
[6] This reconstruction began in approximately 539 B.C.E. when Babylon was conquered by Cyrus who “subsequently issued a decree that provided for the rebuilding of the Jewish Temple (Ezra 1:1-11).” Shanks, ed., Ancient Israel, 218.

The Late, Great Planet Jerusalem: A Historical, Canonical Reading of II Peter 3 (Part II)

2006-01-10T15:18:00.000-05:00

But do not ignore this one fact, beloved, that with the Lord one day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like one day. The Lord is not slow about his promise, as some think of slowness, but is patient with you, not wanting any to perish, but all to come to repentance. But the day of the Lord will come like a thief, and then the heavens will pass away with a loud noise, and the elements will be dissolved with fire, and the earth and everything that is done on it will be disclosed. (II Peter 3:8-10)
In verse 8, Peter alludes to Psalms 90:4 to accentuate that the scoffers of verse 3 ignore that “judgment is God’s business and will be accomplished on God’s schedule.”[1] Peter reassures the reader in verse 9 that God “is patient…not wanting any to perish, but all to come to repentance” and that, in verse 10, “the day of the Lord will come like a thief”.
Later in verse 10, Peter begins to describe the “day of the Lord”. Peter writes that “the heavens will pass away with a loud noise”. The Greek word that is translated “pass away” is παρέρχλέω (parerchomai) which is better translated as “come near”. This passage seems to be referring to the parousia as opposed to destruction. This can be supported by I Thessalonians 4:16, “The Lord himself shall descend from heaven, with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God.” If παρέρχλέω is better translated as “come near” then this gives addition support to the thesis that “fire” signifies the presence of the God. The auf/gabe of God “comes near”[2]; God is present.
Peter’s next description of the “day of judgment” is that “the elements will be dissolved with fire.” Here in verse 10, “dissolved” is from the Greek λύω (luo) which literally means “loosed”. In Luke 13:12, λύω is translated as “set free”. Why “set free” in Luke and “dissolved” in II Peter 3:10? This could be explained by returning to the discussion above concerning Paul’s description of “the Day” in I Corinthians 3. This dissolving/loosing fire in II Peter 3:10 may be similar to the revealing/burning fire of which Paul is writing. Either the “elements” are tested and survive the fire and are “loosed” or they are tested, found wanting, and are “dissolved”. If II Peter is referring to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 70 A.D., as introduced above, we find, historically, that the Temple was destroyed.
In the subsequent phrase, Peter writes that “the earth and everything that is done on it will be disclosed.”[3] Other versions of the Bible translate this passage differently; the New American Standard[4] and the New Jerusalem Bible[5] read, “will be burned up”, the KJV[6], “shall burn up”, and the NIV[7], “will be laid bare.” The Textus Receptus[8] uses the verb κατακαεσεται (katakaesetai) as the Greek word for “burned up” and this is used in all Bible translation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including the King James Version in 1611. The Textus Receptus translation was soon rejected, due to the discovery and publication of Codex Sinaiticus and Codex Vaticanus, both uncial manuscripts of the fourth century. In these texts, the verb used in this verse is εύρεστεσεται (heuresthesetai), “will be found”.[9] If “will be found” is more accurate, this strengthens the connection between II Peter 3:10 and I Corinthians 3:11-15.
[1] Fred B. Craddock, First and Second Peter and Jude, Westminster Bible Companion, Westminster John Knox Press, 1995, 120.
[2] See Nik Ansell’s commentary on Colossians 3:1f in Third Way, February 1999, 12. “Sometimes, heaven and God become almost synonymous – so Matthew uses the term ‘the kingdom of heaven’ where Mark and Luke refer to ‘the kingdom of God’.”
[3] NRSV text note: “Other ancient authorities read will be burned up”.
[4] New American Standard Bible, The Lockman Foundation, 1995. NASB text note: “Two early mss read discovered”.
[5] The New Jerusalem Bible, Doubleday, 1985.
[6] The Authorized King James Version, 1611.
[7] New International Version. NIV text note: “Some manuscripts be burned up”.
[8] “Received Text”. First published in 1516.
[9]Albert M. Wolters, “Worldview and Textual Criticism in 2 Peter 3:10”, Westminster Theological Journal, 49.2, 1987, 405-413.

The Late, Great Planet Jerusalem: A Historical, Canonical Reading of II Peter 3(Part I)

2006-01-09T00:45:00.000-05:00

This is now, beloved, the second letter I am writing to you; in them I am trying to arouse your sincere intention by reminding you that you should remember the words spoken in the past by the holy prophets, and the commandment of the Lord and Savior spoken through your apostles. First of all you must understand this, that in the last days scoffers will come, scoffing and indulging their own lusts and saying, "Where is the promise of his coming? For ever since our ancestors died, all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation!" They deliberately ignore this fact, that by the word of God heavens existed long ago and an earth was formed out of water and by means of water, through which the world of that time was deluged with water and perished. But by the same word the present heavens and earth have been reserved for fire, being kept until the day of judgment and destruction of the godless. (II Peter 3:1-7)[1]
In this passage, the purpose of II Peter 3 is revealed. Peter is writing to combat “scoffers” who question the παρουσία (parousia) of Christ due to its supposed delay. The preponderance of English translations interpret παρουσία as “coming”, but, παρουσία (literally “with being”) would be better translated as “presence”. This may appear, presently, as an argument over epiphoric semiotics, however, translating παρουσία more accurately as “presence” has discursive implications later in this passage particularly in verse 7, where we read that “the present heavens and earth are reserved for fire…”
Reading verse 7 in its canonical context, “fire”, throughout both the Old and New Testaments, refers to the divine presence of God. In the Old Testament, אש (‘esh) refers to the presence of God in the burning bush in Exodus 3:2, in the pillar of fire in Exodus 13:21, consuming the burnt offerings in Leviticus 9:24, God is called a “consuming fire” in Deuteronomy 4:24, Micah 1:3-4 reads that “the Lord is coming out of his place…[and that] mountains will melt under him and the valleys will burst open, like wax near a fire”, and Malachi describes God as a “refiner’s fire” in 3:2. Likewise, in the New Testament the divine presence of God is signified by “fire” (πυρ). In Matthew 3:11, God is symbolized as “unquenchable fire”, in I Thessalonians 5:19, Paul writes “Do not put out the Spirit’s fire (NIV[2]), and in Hebrews 12:29, “consuming fire” is used as a metaphor for God. Therefore, it seems that in this discussion of the parousia in II Peter 3, “fire” can be read as referring to the presence of God.
There is, however, another biblical use of “fire”; to signify God’s judgment. This metaphor is used extensively throughout the Old Testament[3]. “Fire” is also used to signify God’s judgment in the apocalyptic literature of the New Testament including Jude Revelation, and II Peter.
The question, then, is whether this use of “fire” in II Peter 3 refers to God’s judgment or God’s divine presence. However, canonically the use of the word “fire” gives the impression that it can refer both to God’s judgment and to God’s divine presence; for example Malachi 3:1-6 and 4:1-6. Therefore, the use of the word “fire” in II Peter 3 has a binary metaphorical meaning signifying both God’s judgment and God’s divine presence.
This, then, concerning the “day of judgment” of verse 7, begs the questions; when, where, upon what and upon whom is this judging presence of God centered? Traditionally, the answer has been that this “day of judgment” is centered upon the entire Creation at the eschaton. However, if II Peter was written prior to the destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 70 A.D. (as I believe that it was), then this judgment would, seemingly, be directed at Jerusalem and the Temple. Upon an initially reading, Peter’s phrase “the present heavens and earth are reserved for fire…” in verse 7 would seem problematic, but, read in their canonical context, they can be interpreted to support this claim. In the Old Testament, Jerusalem “is viewed as a microcosm of the whole world, its Temple representing the very structure of creation.”[4] Perhaps the example of this that is most similar to the present study would be found in the book of Isaiah. Isaiah 24:1 reads, “Now the LORD is about to lay waste the earth and make it desolate…” A prominent interpretation of Isaiah posits that when Isaiah refers to judgment on the “earth” he is no longer referring to the destruction of Jerusalem in 587-586 B.C.E., but is then shifting to an eschatological prophecy. The note on chapters 24-27 in The Jewish Study Bible reads, “These [chapters] form a distinct section within the book of Isaiah. They refer to no specific historical situation but are concerned instead with a future time in which the world will undergo sweeping devastation, after which redemption will come to survivors from all the nations.”[5] However, the text does not seem to support such an anachronistic interpretation. Isaiah 1-39 is a prophetic passage concerning the impinging destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple at the hands of Babylonians under Nebuchadnezzar in 587-586 B.C.E.[6]. As Walter Brueggemann writes, “It is Jerusalem that is under judgment and that draws the negating attention of Yahweh.”[7] Elsewhere, Brueggemann writes of chapters 1-39; “In these chapters we are made aware that God will judge the city and its wayward economic and military policies, which are rooted in unfaith.”[8] Jerusalem, in the book of Isaiah, is viewed as a microcosm “representing the whole creation in its hostility toward God”[9]. Therefore, judgment on Jerusalem is judgment on the whole Creation. The destruction of Jerusalem and the Temple in 587-586 B.C.E., of which Isaiah prophesizes, will have “cosmic implications.”[10] Thus, when Isaiah writes that ““Now the LORD is about to lay waste the earth and make it desolate…” in 24:1, he has not redirected his focus from his prophecy of Jerusalem’s imminent destruction onto some eschatological event. He has, however, simply articulated the attitude of his contemporary audience concerning Jerusalem and the Temple. Returning to II Peter 3, “the present heavens and earth” that “have been reserved for fire” refers to a similar, but separate, historical and canonical event; God’s judgment upon Jerusalem (“as a microcosm of the whole world”) and the Temple (“representing the very structure of creation”) in 70 A.D. [11].
Finally, Peter states that this “day of judgment” is coupled with “the destruction of the godless.” In Paul’s discussion of “the Day” in I Corinthians 3:11-15, he writes,
For no one can lay any foundation other than the one that has been laid; that foundation is Jesus Christ. Now if anyone builds on the foundation with gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, straw—the work of each builder will become visible, for the Day will disclose it, because it will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test what sort of work each has done. If what has been built on the foundation survives, the builder will receive a reward. If the work is burned up, the builder will suffer loss; the builder will be saved, but only as through fire.
Therefore, reading II Peter in its canonical context, following I Corinthians, “the Day” is less a day of destruction of godless humans and more a day of revelation of the quality of humanity’s work. Paul points out that the godless “work is burned up” and that “the builder will suffer loss”, nevertheless, “the builder will be saved”.
[1] All Scripture quotations are from the NRSV unless otherwise noted. New Revised Standard Version Bible, Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, 1989.
[2] New International Version, International Bible Society, 1973.
[3] See Genesis 19:24, Deuteronomy 9:3, 13:12-18, 32:15-43, Joshua 6:24, 8:8; 19, 11:6,9,11, Judges 1:8, 2 Kings 2:11, 6:17, Job 15:34, 20:26, Psalm 11:5-6, 18:6ff, 21:9, 50:3-6, 68:2, 78:21, 79:5ff, 83:14-18, 97:3ff, Isaiah 1:7, 5:24-25, 9:5, 10:16-19, 26:11, 29:6, 30:27-33, 31:9, 33:11-12, 33:13-15, 34:1-10, 47:14, 64:1-11, 66:15-24, Jeremiah 4:4, 15:14, 17:1-4, 27, 21:10-14, 34:2, 22, 37:8, 10, 38:17, 18, 23, 43:12-13, 48:45, 50:32, 51:58, 52:13, Lamentations 2:3-4, 4:11, Ezekiel 5:4, 10:2, 15:1-8, 19:10-14, 20:45-49, 21:28-32, 22:17-22, 23:25, 24:9-14, 28:18-19, 30:6-9,14,16, 36:5-7, 38:17-23, 39:6, Daniel 7:9-12, Hosea 8:14, Joel 1:19-20, Joel 2:3,5, 2:30, Amos 1-2:5, 5:6, Obadiah 18, Micah 1:2-7, Nahum 1:5-6, 3:13-15, Habakkuk 2:13, Zephaniah 1:14-18, 3:8, Zechariah 2:5-13, 3:2, 13:9, Malachi 3:1-6, 4:1-6.
[4] Nicholas John Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, The Annihilation of Hell: Universal Salvation and the Redemption of Time in the Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann, ICS, 2005, 413.
[5] The Jewish Study Bible, Tanakh Translation, Oxford University Press, 2004, 829.
[6] Hershel Shanks ed,. Ancient Israel: From Abraham to the Roman Destruction of Temple, Bible Archaeology Society, 1999, 199.
[7] Walter Brueggemann, Isaiah 1-39, Westminster Bible Companion, Westminster John Knox Press, 1998, 2 and Walter Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, Westminster Bible Companion, Westminster John Know Press, 1998, 2. Emphasis Brueggemann’s.
[8] Walter Brueggemann, Isaiah, The Renovaré Spiritual Formation Bible, Harper San Francisco, 2005, 982.
[9] Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, 415.
[10] Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, 413.
[11] Ansell, “An Apocalyptic Appendix”, 413.

"The Magnificat" and the Scandal of Christmas

2005-12-15T19:07:00.000-05:00

Remember Mary's Song, "The Magnificat" (Luke 1:46-53), this Christmas: "My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God my Savior, for he has looked with favor on the lowliness of his servant. Surely, from now on all generations will call me blessed; for the Mighty One has done great things for me, and holy is his name. His mercy is for those who fear him from generation to generation. He has shown strength with his arm; he has scattered the proud in the thoughts of their hearts. He has brought down the powerful from their thrones, and lifted up the lowly; he has filled the hungry with good things, and sent the rich away empty."
This Christmas season, let's stop the irrelevant cries against the supposed scandal of Christmas, the secular oppression of taking Christ out of Christmas and instead seek to right true injustice such as the budget proposed by the House of Representatives that cuts food stamps, health care, child support, and educational assistance to low-income families - while further lowering taxes for the wealthiest Americans and increasing the deficit for all of our grandchildren. Or to feed those who go hungry. Or to warm those without housing. This is the true scandal of Christmas, Christians turning the blind eye to "the least of these" who Christ particularly told us to care for. As the "Body of Christ" let's begin lifting up the lowly and filling the hungry with good things this Christmas season. This is what Christmas is all about, at least it is what Christ was all about. What is the real scandal of Christmas?

The High Cost of Low Prices

2005-12-13T20:20:00.000-05:00

WAL-MART: THE HIGH COST OF LOW PRICE is a feature length documentary that uncovers a retail giant's assault on families and American values.
The film dives into the deeply personal stories and everyday lives of families and communities struggling to fight a goliath. A working mother is forced to turn to public assistance to provide healthcare for her two small children. A Missouri family loses its business after Wal-Mart is given over $2 million to open its doors down the road. A mayor struggles to equip his first responders after Wal-Mart pulls out and relocates just outside the city limits. A community in California unites, takes on the giant, and wins!
Producer/Director Robert Greenwald and Brave New Films take you on an extraordinary journey that will change the way you think, feel -- and shop.

Read some breathtaking statistics at: http://www.walmartmovie.com/facts.php

Parody as Critique

2005-12-09T00:07:00.000-05:00

Christian Peacemaker Teams: Committed to Reducing Violence by "Getting in the Way"

2005-12-05T13:24:00.000-05:00

On November 29th, the Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) confirmed that the four human rights workers who were reported missing in Baghdad on November 26 were associated with CPT.

Tom Fox, age 54, is from Clearbrook, Virginia and is a dedicated father of two children. For the past two years, Mr. Fox has worked with CPT in partnership with Iraqi human rights organizations to promote peace. Mr. Fox has been faithful in the observance of Quaker practice for 22 years. While in Iraq, he sought a more complete understanding of Islamic cultural richness. He is committed to telling the truth to U.S. citizens about the horrors of war and its effects on ordinary Iraqi civilians and families as a result of U.S. policies and practices. Mr. Fox is an accomplished musician. He plays the bass clarinet and the recorder and he loves to cook. He has also worked as a professional grocer. Mr. Fox devotes much of his time to working with children. He has served as an adult leader of youth programs and worked at a Quaker camp for youth. He has facilitated young people's participation in opposing war and violence. Mr. Fox is a quiet and peaceful man, respectful of everyone, who believes that "there is that of God in every person" which is why work for peace is so important to him.

Norman Kember, age 74, is from London, England. He and his wife of 45 years have two married daughters and a 3-year old grandson. He has been a pacifist all his life beginning with his work in a hospital instead of National Service at age 18. Before his retirement he was a professor teaching medical students at St Bartholemew's Hospital in London. He is well known as a peace activist, and has been involved in several peace groups. For the past 10 years he has volunteered with a local program providing free food to the homeless. He likes walking, birdwatching, and writing humorous songs and sketches. In his younger days he enjoyed mountaineering.

James Loney, 41, is a community worker from Toronto, Canada. He has been a member of Christian Peacemaker Teams since August 2000, and is currently the Program Coordinator for CPT Canada. On previous visits to Iraq, his work focused on taking testimonies from families of detainees for CPT's report on detainee abuse, and making recommendations for securing basic legal rights. James was leading the November 2005 delegation in Iraq when he went missing. James is a peace activist, writer, trained mediator, and works actively with two Toronto community conflict resolution services. He has spent many years working to provide housing and support for homeless people. In a personal statement from James to CPT, he writes: “I believe that our actions as a people of peace must be an expression of hope for everyone. My hope in practising non-violence is that I can be a conduit for the transformative power of God's love acting upon me as much as I hope it will act upon others around me.”

Harmeet Singh Sooden, 32 is a Canadian electrical engineer from Montreal. He studdied at McGill University and is now working on a masters degree in English literature inAuckland University in New Zealand to prepare for a teaching career. He enjoys art, is active in squash and worked part time as a local squash coach. His family describes him as peaceful and fun-loving and he is known to be passionate about the plight of the underprivileged around the globe. He works tirelessly in his spare time to educate and help others.

This organization is committed to peaceableness, understands that violence does not lead to peace, and is comprised of people who are willing to risk their lives for peace. They ask the question: "What would happen if Christians devoted the same discipline and self-sacrifice to nonviolent peacemaking that armies devote to war?" Which sounds similar to Berry's closing paragraph in "A Citizen's Response", "We can no longer afford to confuse peaceablility with passivity. Authentic peace is no more passive than war. Like war, it calls for discipline and intelligence and strength of character, though it calls also for higher principles and aims. If we are serious about peace, then we must work for it as ardently, seriously, continuously, carefully, and bravely as we have ever prepared for war."
Check out the website at www.cpt.org and especially the Testimonies of Human Rights Abuses at http://www.cpt.org/iraq/iraqtestimonies.php.

The Canadian Prohibition and the Rise of the Speakeasy?

2005-12-03T18:15:00.000-05:00

In November 2004, the New Democratic Party (NDP) introduced a bill in the Canadian Parliament which would effectively ban trans fats. Click here to read the bill. In response to this initiative, the House of Commons by 193 to 73 passed a motion calling for the establishment of the task force, followed by regulations or a law to limit trans-fat content in all food products. Click here to read the motion and to see how each M.P. voted.
As a direct result of the NDP's initiative, the Canadian Government health ministry, Health Canada, announced the formation of a task force to "develop recommendations and strategies for reducing trans fats in Canadian foods to the lowest levels possible." Click here to read the government announcement.
The NDP's initiative originated with the work of Pat Martin, M.P., the primary anti-trans fat advocate in Canada. NDP leader, Jack Layton, M.P. introduced the motion in the House of Commons and has taken this issue forward with Pat Martin.

Canadian MP Pat Martin,dedicated anti-trans fat campaigner
Incidentally, we have provided information and support to Pat Martin and his excellent staff and will continue to do so.
In August 2005, the Trans Fat Task Force created by the Canadian Government health ministry issued an interim report. Click here to read the report. Click here to read the Canadian Government's response to the interim report.

Will this change due to the declaration of "no confidence" and the upcoming election?
If the newly elected officials pick this up where the liberals left off, will this be the Canadian version of the Prohibition? Will Canadians establish and frequent Speakeasy's to enjoy apple danishes, battered fish, pizza, tubs of lard, or anything else dripping with partially hydrogenated oil?
In a country that helps drug addicts inject, made up an official national greeting ("cheemo") that didn't catch on, and attempts to ban trans fats...time will tell, but anything is possible (and the trip there promises to be interesting).

Dust and Patriarchy in Eden? An Unconfident Reading of Genesis 2

2005-11-22T22:25:00.000-05:00

In his recent essay “The Burden of the Gospels: An Unconfident Reader.” Wendell Berry writes:

"Anybody half awake these days will be aware that there are many Christians who are exceedingly confident in their understanding of the Gospels, and who are exceedingly self-confident in their understanding of themselves in their faith. They appear to know precisely the purposes of God, and they appear to be perfectly assured that they are now doing, and in every circumstance will continue to do, precisely God's will as it applies specifically to themselves. They are confident, moreover, that God hates people whose faith differs from their own, and they are happy to concur in that hatred."

Clearly, there’s much in these sentences to reflect on. For instance, we could talk about the political implications of Christian self-confidence and excess— the way in which knowing “precisely the purposes of God” feeds into a religious ideology that requires the State to become a Christian State before the second coming of Christ can occur. Or the way in which Christian self-confidence and excess sustains a political and cultural climate in which torture, well, really isn’t as bad as it used to be…
But this isn’t what I’m going to be typing about—I mention it simply because it weighs on me.
Instead, what I want to focus on is the first sentence from the passage from Berry:
“[T]here are many Christians who are exceedingly confident in their understanding of the Gospels and who are exceedingly self-confident in their understanding of themselves in faith.” As I read Berry, such excess is far from virtuous. Indeed, it’s debilitating, leading inexorably in the direction of hatred and sin.
For my part, I have to confess that such extreme confidence doesn’t come naturally to me—neither in my understanding of the Gospels, the Biblical narrative, nor in my understanding of my faith. There’s much I don’t get. Berry teaches me to see this uncertainty in a positive light.
Often my lack of understanding takes the form of questions. If I can be forgiven for using an allusion to the writings of a pagan philosopher in the context of quasi-theology, reading the biblical text often leaves me feeling like the young Theatetus in conversation with Socrates: My head is swimming when I think about these matters!
So let me share with you some of my perplexities— some of the things I don’t get—when I experience when read Genesis 2-3. Seemingly even before the so-called fall, things in paradise seemed far from perfect. Consider the following two points:
First, Adam is made from “dust from the ground”. Dust is associated in our story with sin, punishment, and death. What’s it doing there from the beginning? Why the reference to sin, punishment, and death before the eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, indeed, before the creation of the woman?
Second, Adam and the Woman exchange not a single word in Genesis 2.
Recall the making and creating of the woman… Noticing Adam is alone; God acknowledges that his creation isn’t “very good”, so he decides that Adam needs a helper. Now, in Hebrew the word for “helper” is ‘ezer kenegdo, which doesn’t mean servant or that the man is the head of the household. It means equality. In fact, it suggests cooperation and otherness. There’s something of the face-to-face relationship at work here.
First, God makes the animals, but they won’t do. Then he creates the “woman”. But when God brings the helper to Adam something very strange happens, and it’s not positive. Adam names her, like he named the animals. And, in doing so, he refers to her in the third person: “This one (zo’t) at last is bone of my bones / and flesh of my flesh; /this one (zo’t) shall be called Woman, / for out of Man this one (zo’t) was taken.”
Note that Adam doesn’t address the “woman”. He doesn’t speak with her and the woman is silent. What are we to make of this failure of dialogue from the beginning?
Why is there no shalom? How does this failure at the interpersonal level condition the emergence of so-called original sin? Certainly this failure of dialogue occurs before the man and the woman disobey God’s commandment.
Sometimes Christians refer to Jesus as the second Adam. It’s in Jesus’ role as the second Adam that I read the following words from the fourth Gospel (John 4:27): “Just then his disciples came. They were astonished that he was speaking with a woman.”
Unlike Adam, Jesus does speak “with a woman”, but not only that, he speaks to her across the division of religious intolerance. I think it is significant that the woman is a Samaritan woman. The Samaritans were the hated other during the Palestine of Jesus’ time.
There are two sets of questions with which I want to end these unconfident ramblings:
1) I think that most would agree that Creation prior to the Fall wasn’t perfect, there was (and is) an intended eschatological movement toward God being “all in all”. However, was there sin in Eden that precedes the disobedience of eating from tree of the knowledge of good and evil? If yes, what are the ramifications? If no, how do you deal with the “dust” and the apparent patriarchy?
2) In what way does Jesus model for us—in John 4 and other places—a way of life that mends the effects of the “sin” in Eden? In what way does dialogue across gender/sexual differences—dialogue that affirms such differences—mend the brokenness of creation? In what way does dialogue across religious differences—dialogue that affirms such differences—mend the brokenness of creation?

Paul, Homosexuality, and Exclusion: Some thoughts on the Epistle to the Romans

2005-11-17T21:23:00.000-05:00

Note: These are just some thoughts. My intent is to question the traditional interpretation of Romans 1:26-32 in light of the book of Romans in hopes to start a dialogue. I am not stating a particular position, nor have I arrived at a final stance on the issue of homosexuality.

Romans 1:26-32 is often used as the "proof" text that is supposed to demonstrate once and for all that same-sex relations are contrary to God's will. Verse 27 does indeed refer to same-sex acts between men, but the previous verse makes no mention of homosexual activity. The parallel with the men's sin is that it was sexual behavior "against nature" - whatever that means. But to assume that lesbianism is what Paul had in mind is simply jumping to conclusions. Both the men and women in question are behaving "against nature", but only the men are said to have same-sex partners. P. Coleman in "Gay Christians: A Moral Dilemma", suggest that the women might (as he delicately puts it) be engaging in sex per anum, a method of contraception used by prostitutes at the time.
Male same-sex relations in Paul's day were predominately (perhaps exclusively) pederastic (between a man and a boy), and often embroiled in the slave trade. Lesbian practice, in this male-centered culture, was only rarely acknowledged. If Paul's list of sins was a "parade" of behavior that was well know and widely abhorred, the "contraceptive" hypothesis would make far more sense of what these women were up to than the traditional interpretation.
Moving along in the Epistle to chapter 2, it is as if Paul is demonstrating to his Christian audience how he might preach the gospel in the Roman Synagogue if he ever made it to their city. No sooner had he finished denouncing a long list of activities that would, in the eyes of any self-respecting Jew, highlight the depravity of the Gentile world than he turned to the people who were saying "Amen": "You, therefore, have no excuse, you who pass judgement on someone else, for at whatever point you judge the other, you are condemning yourself, because you who pass judgment do the same things." This is traditionally taken as an indictment against hypocrisy, which was then added to the long list of sins. But what if the target was the whole mentality that was so keen to point out the differences between Jew and Gentile that it was erecting a barrier between God and the people he wanted to reach? This would explain why Paul goes on to say in 2:24 that "God's name is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you."
If this was his point, that long list of sins - including the "unnatural" sexual acts - was primarily rhetorical. The apostle's main aim was to expose the judgemental attitude of his audience. In this light, it is very hard to work out what his own attitude toward these "unnatural" acts might have been.
The only other text in the entire New Testament where something is described as being 'against nature" comes later in Romans itself, chapter 11. In verse 24, Paul referred to the Gentiles as the wild olive branches whom God was grafting "against nature" into the cultivated olive tree of Israel. It was God himself who was the perpetrator of this "unnatural" act. And it was precisely the same people who would have objected to the unions of chapter 1 that would most likely oppose the bringing together of Jew and Gentile.
For a while the sexual unions in question were naturally infertile and devoid of commitment, but God's faithfulness was now bearing fruit. With the entry of the Gentiles into the covenant, God's promise to Abraham to give him descendents as numerous as the stars was finally being fulfilled. God was acting "against nature", but far from breaking the order of creation, he was breaking through the barriers that people were putting up.
Is it ironic that a letter written to oppose one form of exclusion is now being used to perpetrate another? Once, Gentiles were told they could join God's people only if they were circumcised according to the Jewish norm. Today, we insist that gays and lesbians conform to the heterosexual norm. Paul was out to expose a judgemental and exclusive mindset. Today we misuse his writings and demonstrate that this same mindset is still flourishing.

The Struggle of Faith: Covenant as Power-Sharing

2005-11-03T20:57:00.000-05:00

In Genesis 18:16-33, we find God and two companions meeting with Abraham before the destruction of Sodom and Gommorrah. God's intent is to destroy the cities. God askes his companions, "Shall I hide from Abraham what I am about to do...?" (verse 18). But God wants Abraham's wisdom. In verse 22, God's two companions leave and, according to the NRSV, "Abraham remained standing before the Lord". However, there is an ancient Hebrew scribal tradition that preserves another text at this point and there are very good grounds for believing that it reflects the original. According to the NRSV footnote this ancient tradition reads, "while the Lord remained standing before Abraham". Likewise, the New Jerusalem Bible reads: "While the men left there and went to Sodom, Yahweh remained in Abraham's presence." Scribes tended to smooth out the harder readings. The harder reading, however, tends to be the correct reading, in this case, "Yahweh remained in Abraham's presence." The passage was changed to place Abraham in the role of submission. However, according this ancient Hebrew scribal tradition, God adopts the role of waiting, of submission.
In the following verses (23-33), Abraham's interchange with God is remarkably bold. "Will you indeed sweep away the righteous with the wicked? Suppose there are fifty righteous within the city; will you then sweep away the place and not forgive it for the fifty righteous who are in it? Far be it from you to do such a thing, to slay the righteous with the wicked, so that the righteous fare as the wicked! Far be that from you! Shall no the Judge of all the earth do what is just?" (23-25) To which the Lord concedes, "If I find at Sodom fifty righteous in the city, I will forgive the whole place for their sake" (26). This conversation continued until the Lord agreed to spare the city for the sake of ten (verse 32). Here, it seems, faith is portrayed as struggle rather than obedience. "Israel", as we may remember, means "the one who wrestles with God" ("Islam" means "the one who submits to God"). "Submission" does not seem to be a word that captures the "covenantal" character of the Biblical Story. The Covenant is a struggle between God and Humanity, a sort of power-sharing, not a submissive obedience to a heteronomous God.

A Passing Thought

2005-11-02T21:10:00.000-05:00

"I think therefore I think I am." - Wendell Berry, "A Passing Thought", Given

I have finally broken down and started a blog. I guess an introduction is in order and perhaps a few remarks about the blog.
My name is Chris Allers. I am from Grant, MI but am currently in my first year of graduate school at the Institute for Christian Studies in Toronto, studying particularly the Philosophy of Religion.
My interests include, but are not limited to:
1. The Interconnectivity of Creation. Maintaining and enacting these connections.
2. The Importance of Place, Community, and Home. I am indebted to authors and scholars such as: Wendell Berry, Matt Bonzo, Steven Bouma-Prediger, Brian Walsh, Wes Jackson, John Inge, Edward S. Casey, etc.
3. Patriotism as "the love for one's place", not as an ideological, abstract love (?) of a vast space, a nomadic people, a present set of governmental leaders, abstract national ideals (that dissolve into the rhetoric of self-justification and self-righteousness), the market, a violent foreign policy...or whatever American Patriotism means.
4. Canonical/Narrative View of the Problem of Evil. Authors such as: Nik Ansell and Tom Wright.
5. The Covenant as power-sharing (as opposed to heteronomous).
6. The Interface between Neo-Calvinist Reformational Philosophy and the Western Philosophical Tradition.
7. Peaceableness. "If we are serious about peace, then we must work for it as ardently, seriously, continuously, carefully, and bravely as we have ever prepared for war." - Wendell Berry, "A Citizen's Response", Citizenship Papers.
8. Agrarianism.
9. Music. From Led Zepplin to Pedro the Lion, James Taylor to Nada Surf, Bob Dylan to Ozma.
10. Joking around. If you come to this site looking for serious, intellectual conversation, you may be let down at times. You are welcome to joke around with the rest of us, or you can check back at another time for conversation that may better satisfy your intellectual hunger.

I like other things too.

In summary, I will post whatever is on my mind.

One last thing, I am interested in hearing your thoughts. However, if you are not a registered user, please leave your name (or some name or whatever) so that responses can be directed to you easily and so all can identify who the responses are directed toward.
Call yourself Jim, Hog Willy Magoo, or even "Socrates is Identical". I don't care.